Performing participation : stakeholders, translations and power in the World Bank participation sourcebook by Trinborg, Kim Jonny
Performing Participation 
 
Stakeholders, Translations & Power in 
The World Bank Participation Sourcebook 
 
 
Kim J. Trinborg 
 
 
 
 
 
Master Thesis Submitted to the Department of Social 
Anthropology 
 
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO 
 
Autumn 2007 
 ii
 
 
 iii
Abstract 
 
 
This thesis is a discursive analysis of the performance of stakeholder participation in 
the World Bank Participation Sourcebook (1996). Stakeholder participation is defined 
as ‘a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development 
initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them’ (ibid: 3). With empirical 
data taken primarily from three case studies presented in the Sourcebook, this thesis 
identifies the various ways in which stakeholder participation is managed when 
transformed into practice. An important premise of these case studies is the perceived 
bipolarity of government and direct beneficiaries as opposing stakeholders. Whereas the 
participation of government representatives is explained as a required necessity, Bank 
task managers utilize different ‘levelling techniques’ in order to increase the visibility 
and participation of weaker, marginalized groups. However, the technically orientated 
rational of the World Bank creates effects that arrange the content of participatory 
processes. I have also identified a number of translations that further demonstrate how 
participatory processes are constrained. I argue that how stakeholder participation is 
translated into practice in effect limits rather than emphasizes its primary definition.  
I have also utilized Foucault’s notion of governmentality to explain the 
rationality of stakeholder participation as a form of government. By approaching 
stakeholder participation as an organized practice, I illuminate the World Bank’s field 
of vision and the technical aspects it depends on. I also discuss what kind of knowledge 
or rationality that informs stakeholder participation as a practice. I argue that how 
stakeholder participation is practiced is the result of tensions between two opposing 
ideas of how to approach development; stakeholders are in different ways included in 
participatory processes, but their participation is arranged in ways that produces results 
that benefit the operational demands of the World Bank. Accordingly, I view the 
examples of stakeholder participation as presented in the Sourcebook as operational 
participation, i.e. as participation to the extent that the operational rationality and 
knowledge of the World Bank allows. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The really helpful things will not be done from the centre; they cannot be done by big 
organizations, but they can be done by the people themselves… (2003: 34). 
 
Schumacher’s formulation comments on a new way of approaching development and 
aid, one in which material needs are to be addressed through localized and community-
based production; it also emphasizes the importance of reforming traditional relations of 
power in development activities. Human-centred development is a perspective that took 
root in development discourse parallel to the rise of neoliberalism during the 1980s. The 
perspective is highly influenced by the article The Meaning of Development (1969) in 
which Seers argued that development should be defined through moral evaluations and 
that the realization of the human potential should happen through certain requirements 
of human needs and political dimensions (Thomas 2003: 33). Its biggest concern is the 
redistribution of power; power should be redistributed from traditional centralized 
instances of power to the direct beneficiaries, i.e. those who are to be ‘developed’. 
Development in this sense not only addresses poverty, but also the strengthening of 
human capacity and freedom; a central component in the ideology of the human-centred 
perspective is the notion that local people should be responsible of and active 
participants in their own development. This notion is central to the idea of participatory 
development. The idea of participatory development is highly influenced by 
neoliberalism; first, advocators of the human-centred approach often express the need to 
minimize state influence within recipient countries and distribute resources directly to 
local people and groups. In addition, participatory development also has a capitalistic 
dimension as many participatory development projects seek to stimulate local 
commercial production (ibid 34). 
 The publication of the World Bank Participation Sourcebook (1996) indicated 
a shift in how the World Bank approach development activities; whereas the traditional 
approach to development used to be what is referred to as the external expert stance, the 
human-centred perspective of the 1980s would eventually direct the World Bank 
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towards more democratically and locally driven approaches to development. This study 
aims to analyze how participation is textually performed and embedded in World Bank 
discourse. In the article Beyond the Formulaic (2001), Hailey questions why 
development institutions and especially development ‘experts’ are so eager to support 
and advocate participatory approaches to development (ibid: 97). In the case of 
contemporary development in general, including the World Bank, development 
institutions and development experts seem more than willing to empower the poor, and 
to share power over decisions and resources. Hailey argues, ‘There has been 
surprisingly little research that offers a critical perspective on the motives, actions and 
agendas of those who promote these participative tools and techniques’ (ibid). He 
continues: 
 
The early work of…Michel Foucault would suggest that unless we understand why the 
development community in general, and the development ‘experts’ in particular promote such 
participative approaches we will never gain a critical insight into their real role and influence 
(ibid).  
 
This study aims to contribute to this lacking research. I wish to explore the role of 
stakeholder participation in World Bank discourse and to describe how stakeholder 
participation is understood and applied to development practice. I also aim to give 
possible explanations as to why the World Bank would promote participatory 
techniques, or in other words, to provide a critical perspective that can explain the 
motives of the World Bank for applying participatory strategies to development 
activities. Now, Hailey’s request implies a research that seeks to find the underlying 
motives and agendas of development institutions and experts that advocate participatory 
initiatives. However, the analysis of discourse can never get behind the discourse, to 
find out what people ‘really’ mean, or to find a genuine reality that lies behind 
discourse. The discourse itself is the object of analysis in this thesis. However, by 
focusing on oral or written statements, one can find patterns that describe the effects 
that discursive constructions of reality have on social processes (Jørgensen & Phillips 
1999: 31).  
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 The World Bank Participation Sourcebook (which I will refer to as just the 
Sourcebook from now on) offers its own understanding of the term participation as it 
divides between the notion of ‘popular participation’ and its own understanding of 
participation formulated as ‘stakeholder participation’. I would later discover that this 
division was only the first of many translations of participation expressed in the 
Sourcebook; the term would take on different meanings when confronted by different 
situations and different stakeholders. What the translations have in common is that they 
in different ways contribute to the simplification and management of complex realities. 
I argue that stakeholder participation as described in the Sourcebook manage the content 
of development activities and can be viewed as a process of power. I will support this 
argument by analyzing three different case studies presented in the Sourcebook. 
Moreover, I will approach the description and analysis of these case studies with the 
following questions in mind:         
        
1. How is stakeholder participation understood and/or translated when introduced to World Bank 
development activities? 
2. How and in what ways do the translations of participation affect the participatory processes of 
the three case studies as revealed in the Sourcebook?  
3. With the prior questions in mind, what could explain stakeholder participation as an exercise of 
power?     
 
Next, I will describe the different historical perspectives of development. I will also 
display how these perspectives interrelate with the creation and later activities of the 
World Bank.  
   
Development as Concept and Practice, and the World Bank 
Development as a concept has had different meanings and understandings throughout 
modern history. Some argue that development as a concept was shaped during the 
Enlightenment period with its emphasis on progress, but also by the idea of evolution 
during the 17th and 18th century (Baaz 2005: 37). The simplest definition of 
development as formulated by Chambers means just ‘good change’, which has a 
positive connotation virtually synonymous with ‘progress’ (Thomas 2000: 23). Some 
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claim that the term ‘underdevelopment’ was formulated in the inaugural address of 
American President Harry Truman on January 20, 1949. The greatest consequence of 
Truman’s development program was the new institutionalisation and practice of 
development, which ultimately led to what we now call the development industry or 
‘the development machine’ (Baaz 2005: 37). However, development as an ‘intentional 
practice’ can be dated approximately a century earlier. As a response to the problems 
created by the ‘immanent development’ of industrial capitalism in the first half of the 
19th century, ‘intentional development’ set out to solve the problem of the ‘surplus 
population’ not integrated in the production process of capitalism as wage-labourers, to 
limit the risk of revolution (Nustad 2004: 14). The notions of social progress, evolution 
and capitalistic development are all examples of immanent development, which 
describes a dynamic ‘that builds on itself and develops from within’ (Thomas 2000: 25). 
These forms of immanent development should be clearly differentiated from the 
intentional development characteristic of the deliberate policy and action of 
development agencies (ibid). Out of these different ways of understanding development, 
Thomas formulates three main senses in which the term is used (ibid: 29): 
 
1. Development as vision, description or measure of the state of being of a desirable society (good 
change). 
2. Development as a historical process of social change in which societies are transformed over 
long periods (immanent development). 
3. Development as consisting of deliberate efforts aimed at improvement on the part of various 
agencies, including governments, all kinds of organizations and social movements (intentional 
development).  
 
The idea of a new economic world order based on a Bank was first proposed by Harry 
D. White. Informed by the depression of the 1920s and 1930s and the importance of 
reforming international trade after the war, White was convinced that the US needed to 
aid the reconstruction of Europe and to stabilize the world market in ‘third world’ 
countries to secure outlets for American products (Nustad 2004: 15). The formation of a 
World Bank was seen as a necessary step in order to guarantee American investment 
(ibid). On the 27th of December 1945, President Truman signed the ‘Bretton Woods 
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Agreement Act’ thus giving life to the World Bank, an institution set up to lend money 
to developing countries (ibid). 
 Besides the economic rationality of this new institutional creation, development 
as an intentional activity was also explicitly political during this period. Truman himself 
saw development as a strategic alternative to communism (ibid: 16). Others were even 
more explicit. Walt W. Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth: a Non-Communist 
Manifesto (1961) had a significant influence on the development discourse of the time. 
In the first part of his book, Rostow delineates a universal model of economic growth 
that all societies must follow, whereas the second part of the book becomes more 
politically explicit. The book had two main objectives; to present a universal idea for 
development, whilst simultaneously maintain the continuous dominance of the Western 
world (Rostow in Nustad 2003: 47). At the heart of Rostows model was the 
understanding that all societies must go through different stages of economic 
development (ibid). Rostows work was a major influence on what later would be called 
the modernization theory that characterised the intentional development of the 1950s 
and 1960s. This perspective saw development as a natural immanent process, where 
societies could be placed on different stages of a timeline; however this immanent 
process could be expedited through intentional development by introducing poor 
countries to modern technology, production and expertise (ibid: 51). 
This perspective was very much present in the initial development activities of 
the World Bank of this period, as the Bank began with a strict focus on funding 
infrastructure in the countries that were granted loans (Nustad 2004: 16). The remedy to 
the poverty of poor nations was the infusion of the ‘bourgeois package’, meaning elites, 
nation-states capital, technology, education and the rule of law. Providing ‘third world’ 
countries with these western ideals would enable them to catch up with western 
industrialised nations (ibid). In the mid-1960s, the Bank became faced with a problem; 
the stress on the creditworthiness of potential lenders eventually led to a situation in 
which the Bank ran out of countries to which they could lend money. As a response, the 
Bank changed its policy and went from funding huge infrastructural programmes 
towards a wider economic policy by directly seeking to influence the economic policy 
of their borrowers (ibid: 17).   
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The modernization theory was widely criticised during the 1970s by a 
perspective called structuralism or the dependency theory. This perspective argued that 
the capitalistic system had evolved from being a system of free competition into a 
monopolistic system and rejected the notion of temporal segregation central to the 
modernization theory. ‘Temporal segregation’ is the idea that poor nations exist in a 
sphere separate from and unaffected by the sphere of richer western nations; in other 
words, it is the idea that ‘their’ poverty has no connection with ‘our’ wealth (Nustad 
2003: 46). Instead, dependency authors saw poverty and wealth as elements of the same 
process, a process that primarily was a political one (ibid: 80). Nustad refers to Frank 
who argued that what developed in the South as an immanent process was the process 
of underdevelopment as a direct consequence of the capitalist world system (2004: 18). 
Although this perspective challenged the capitalist orientation of development 
institutions, critics of the dependency theory states that the tradition did not challenge 
and transcend the dichotomy of ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ countries. What it 
did however was to replace expert knowledge of development with expert knowledge of 
underdevelopment, which illustrates the extent to which development has been 
established as a hegemonic idea (ibid: 19).  
The World Bank was probably less occupied with the squabbles of development 
critics during the 1970s, and more focused on the fact that debtor countries had 
difficulties repaying their loans. Money was being spent on projects with no promise of 
future returns, or being stowed away in international banking accounts by ‘development 
country elites’ (ibid). In an attempt to prevent an international economic crisis by 
defaulting loans, World Bank policy embraced ‘structural adjustment programs’        
during the 1980s and the 1990s, that sought to stabilize the situation by providing 
further loans to pay off interests on debt (ibid). The granting of these programs was 
conditional on a restructuring of economic policy in line with present neoliberal 
economic theory (ibid). Neoliberalism became a dominant perspective of development 
in 1980s. This perspective considers capitalistic development as the most important 
strategy towards modernization. Moreover, it argues that intentional development 
creates problems for a ‘well functioning free market’. The reason why societies have 
developed in different directions is explained by three dimensions of obstacles in ‘third 
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world’ countries. The first obstacle is tradition, as traditional social relations and 
systems of retribution are seen as barriers for the commercialization of production. The 
second obstacle is monopoly, which creates problems for a self-regulating market. The 
third obstacle is state regulation, which according to the neoliberal view should be 
minimized. The role of the state should first and foremost be as a protector of capitalism 
and the free market by guaranteeing political order and the security of those that ‘comes 
short’ in the competitive capitalist market (Thomas 2003: 42-45). Neoliberalism is in 
this sense not only concerned with economy, but also with politics as embracing 
economic liberalism to promote economic development will also secure political 
liberty.  
 As mentioned earlier, human-centred development is a perspective formulated 
parallel to the rise of neoliberalism during the 1980s and the focus on human needs is 
clearly aligned with the neoliberal devaluation of state influence in economic processes. 
In participatory development there is an increased focus on ‘bottom-up’ development 
and making people central to development ‘by encouraging beneficiary involvement in 
interventions that affect them and over which they previously had limited control or 
influence’ (Cooke & Kothari 2001: 5). Recognizing and supporting greater involvement 
of local perspectives, knowledge and priorities, have been adopted rapidly and widely 
by development agencies (ibid), including the World Bank. The Sourcebook certainly 
embraces the idea of increased beneficiary involvement; however, it also expresses 
sensitivity towards other groups that can be affected by World Bank development 
initiatives. The Sourcebook’s definition of participation thus focuses on the participation 
of the multitude of affected stakeholders in which direct beneficiaries is counted as but 
one, though important stakeholder.       
 
Describing ‘the Field’ 
The Sourcebook is the most important document to come out of what Francis refers to 
as a ‘learning process’ in which the vocabulary and practice of participatory 
development began to enter ‘the mainstream of World Bank operations’ (2001: 78). As 
the Sourcebook contrasts the participatory approach to the traditional and 
technologically orientated external expert stance, it seems unwilling to be too 
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deterministic about participation (1996: 4). However, the document still formulates its 
own take on participation, one that is based on the principles of ‘joint learning 
experience, engendering inventiveness and commitment on all sides’ (Francis 2001: 
78).  
By whom is the Sourcebook written? The Sourcebook was first published in 
1996, which signified a shift in perspective and approach to development activities. 
Formulated by the ‘Environment Department’s Social Policy Division’ (ENVSP), the 
Sourcebook consists of a collection of texts contributed by the efforts of approximately 
two hundred people, including Bank staff and external consultants. Arguably, the most 
important contributors to the Sourcebook are the task managers; these Bank 
representatives voice sixteen different case studies that describe the successes (and 
frustrations) of working with participatory approached development projects (1996: xi).   
 How is the text structured? The Sourcebook is a 250-page document consisting 
of four chapters, an introduction and two appendixes. The first chapter titled 
Reflections: What is Participation? explains the primary understanding of participation 
in World Bank development practice. The most interesting aspect of this chapter is the 
dissociation between the notion of ‘popular participation’ and ‘stakeholder 
participation’. The second chapter titled Sharing Experiences presents sixteen different 
World Bank development projects in which participatory strategies have been applied. 
These projects have been designed and implemented in a wide variety of nations, 
mainly in the regions of northern and southern Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin 
America, and within different economic and social sectors, both on micro and macro 
levels. The case studies also offer different strategies of participation used when dealing 
with different sets of stakeholders within different contexts of development activities. 
The Sourcebook comments on an important limitation regarding these case studies. 
They primarily describe participation that happens during the preparation and planning 
phases of projects and to a much lesser degree during implementation phases. The 
Sourcebook states that this ‘planning bias’ reflects the infancy of the Bank’s 
institutional commitment to supporting participatory approaches (ibid: 10). The third 
chapter, Practice Pointers in Participatory Planning and Decision-making, draws on 
the field experiences of task managers and is meant to guide the reader through the 
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different steps of participatory planning and decision-making, whilst the fourth chapter, 
Practice Pointers in Enabling the Poor to Participate, focuses on ‘the poor’ as a 
stakeholder and common barriers to their participation. 
 Why was the Sourcebook written and towards what audience? Originally, the 
Sourcebook intended to focus on ‘popular participation’, defined as the ‘participation of 
the poor and others who are disadvantaged in terms of wealth, education, ethnicity and 
gender’ (ibid: 6). However, during the documentation of the case studies, they 
discovered the range of other stakeholders that existed in World Bank operations. The 
participation of these groups was also important, since bypassing them could lead to 
situations of opposition that could create problems for project implementation. Thus, 
the Sourcebook shifted its focus from ‘popular participation’ to ‘stakeholder 
participation’ (ibid). The Sourcebook follows the definition of participation adopted by 
the Bank’s ‘Learning Group on Participatory Development’ which states that 
‘participation is a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over 
development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them’ (ibid: xi). 
The Sourcebook was written to discover how the contents of this definition could be 
achieved, and it does so primarily by drawing on the experiences and situations of 
World Bank development projects that has been carried out in a participatory manner 
(ibid). The Sourcebook states that: 
 
The Sourcebook is not a policy document on participation; nor is it to be read cover to cover. It 
also does not seek to persuade anyone (other than through example) to use participatory 
approaches. It is primarily intended for readers who have already decided to use participatory 
approaches in their professional work (ibid). 
 
This statement signifies what Francis refers to as the learning period of participatory 
development in World Bank development practice. However, the text states that it still 
hopes to strengthen the way the readers think about participation and the way they 
incorporate these ideas into their work. The Sourcebook claims that its idea about 
participation is only one way of understanding the term, but still expresses confidence 
that the participatory approaches presented in the Sourcebook can ‘improve projects, 
contribute to the development process and help reach the poor’ (ibid)  
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Finding ‘Experiences’  
When I first decided to write a thesis on development, participatory development 
seemed like an obvious and interesting direction to take. Participation has certainly 
rooted itself in contemporary development, and gradually gained a hegemonic position 
both as a term and as an activity in general development discourse. I was also aware of 
the more than adequate size of literature on participatory development, and thus 
confident that the theoretical aspect of the thesis would not pose any serious challenges 
in terms of accessibility. What I needed then was empirical data. I figured a good place 
to start my search would be to look at the larger international development institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. By typing 
‘participation’ in the search engine of the official web page of the World Bank 
(worldbank.org), I soon came across the document that later would become the ‘field’ 
of this thesis, i.e. the Sourcebook. I had earlier envisioned that my empirical data would 
be collected from various documents from a different range of institutions and agencies, 
and examine participation in general development discourses. However, the Sourcebook 
offers an extensive description (approximately 250 pages) and understanding of 
participation by one of the largest and most influential development agencies in the 
world. Moreover, what the Sourcebook offers that really caught my attention, is the 
sixteen different field experiences described by Bank staff; the Sourcebook not only 
offers perspectives of how participation is understood as a term, but also descriptions of 
participation when introduced to actual development activities. These experiences are 
the greatest strength of the Sourcebook and the main reason to why I chose this specific 
document as a source of empirical data. 
 The second chapter of the Sourcebook presents sixteen different case studies in 
which World Bank task managers describe both the frustrations and rewards of 
designing and implementing participatory approached development projects. How I 
initially approached these case studies was simply by reading them in the alphabetical 
order they were presented. Whilst I read them, I would also take notes and formulate an 
overview describing the most important aspects of all the case studies. The reason for 
doing this was not only to order the material and to narrow it down; I initially intended 
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to use examples from all the case studies in the Sourcebook. However, when going over 
the case studies for the second time, I made a discovery that would fundamentally direct 
the writing of this thesis. The fifth case study titled Colombia: Electricity Sector Reform 
describes the successful achievements of a participatory approached development 
workshop initiated by the World Bank in collaboration with the Colombian government. 
Faced with possible bankruptcy in the electricity sector, the workshop had provided the 
Colombian participants with a forum that enabled them to interact as equals 
(independently of positions in government) and collaboratively and democratically find 
solutions to solve their own problems. In the latter part of the case study, the task 
manager listed the concrete recommendations that the Colombian participants had 
formulated collaborately over a three-day period. However, upon reading these 
solutions, something seemed oddly familiar. I remembered reading that prior to the 
participatory approached workshop, the task manager had organized an assessment 
group consisting of fifteen Bank staff representatives ‘familiar with Colombia’ (1996: 
39) to examine the severity of the Colombian energy crisis and to find out what 
measures could be taken to avoid further problems. I went back to the section in which 
this ‘expert workshop’ was described and discovered that the solutions they had 
proposed were close to identical to those formulated at the participatory approached 
workshop. These two separate events, one characterised by the activities of external 
experts and the other by the collaborative efforts of participants had produced the same 
solutions, different only in the slightest nuance of formulation. Were the similar 
solutions merely a coincidence or would a closer examination of the participatory 
process show instances of control that guided the Colombian participants in a specific 
direction? This question prompted me to investigate the relationship between 
participation and power, and take a stance that would fundamentally affect the 
methodological and theoretical foundation of this thesis.  
 The Colombia case differed quite drastically from the other case studies in 
terms of participants, which in this particular example were taken primarily from 
different governmental positions. Thus I wanted to find other case studies that described 
the participation of direct beneficiaries, i.e. the groups of people often labelled as ‘poor’ 
and ‘voiceless’. I wanted to find out whether the Sourcebook would offer other and 
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different descriptions of participation when confronted with the interaction of ‘less than 
powerful’ groups. I also wanted to find out if these examples would present similar 
instances of control as in the Colombia case. I was able to find two such examples that 
described the participation of direct beneficiaries, though in dramatically different 
versions. The Nigeria: Women in Agriculture example describes a project that sought to 
address the deficiencies of female inclusion in agricultural programs and does so, 
ironically, by excluding women farmers from the decision-making process. The third 
case study that I will analyze is called the Egypt: Matruh Resource Management 
Project. This case study offers an example of how the extensive mapping of a Bedouin 
community is utilized in the creation of ‘community groups’ organized through 
traditional Bedouin relations of power. In the process of selecting case studies, I 
actively read all the examples presented in Sharing Experiences with the intent of 
finding cases that described different understandings of participation. I argue that I have 
managed to do just that. The three case studies I have selected are different in terms of 
space (as in sectors and areas of decision-making) and content (as in different 
stakeholders). Although the case studies offer different versions of stakeholder 
participation, their common denominator is how the participatory content is managed. 
A short comment should also be directed towards the different actors or 
stakeholders whose participation is described in the Sourcebook. Naturally, the World 
Bank is the most important actor, and I have approached the Bank just as that, as one 
actor. This view is certainly over-simplistic and blind towards the complex inner 
workings of a multilateral institution such as the World Bank. However, to approach the 
World Bank as one actor is justified because of the apparent consistency of the 
Sourcebook (both in terms of structure and content) and the fact that even though the 
document consist of several contributions from different individuals and groups, the 
Sourcebook as a whole speaks on behalf of the World Bank as an institution. So when I 
describe statements and actions of the World Bank, the Sourcebook and task managers 
(as representatives of the World Bank), I refer to them as the same actor. I thus view the 
Sourcebook as a voice of the World Bank. 
Although the Sourcebook states that there are a multitude of stakeholders that can 
affect or be affected by World Bank development activities, primarily two groups of 
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stakeholders besides the World Bank, will be focused on; the government and direct 
beneficiaries (or the ‘the poor’). The dichotomy of these two groups is particularly 
evident and addressed in the Nigeria case and the Egypt case, cases that illustrates how 
the World Bank views and manages situations in which powerful stakeholders are 
meant to interact with and participate alongside the marginalized poor as stakeholders. 
This thesis is thus primarily concerned with three stakeholders: the Bank, government 
and direct beneficiaries.          
 
Discursive Analysis as Theory and Methodology  
This study is a textual discursive analysis of stakeholder participation as performed in 
the Sourcebook. The Sourcebook deals with cultural contexts, social situations and 
human pragmatism; in other words, the document presents an understanding of different 
social worlds of human interaction and of groups of people that are divided 
geographically, but unified by their involvement in World Bank development 
initiatives; more importantly, they are unified by participation. The Sourcebook 
however is not the social world; it is merely something that constitutes the social world. 
It is a written performance of space, of social relationships and of behaviour; even more 
importantly, it is a written performance of participation. Thus, I have approached the 
Sourcebook as a discursive expression of stakeholder participation. Jørgensen & 
Phillips defines the most fundamental understanding of discourse as: 
 
…a certain way of speaking of and understanding the world – or a section of the world (2006: 9) 
 
Although the term ‘discourse’ has been used differently and with various 
understandings in scientific literature and debates, it is usually understood through the 
idea that language is structured in a way that patterns our statements when interacting 
within different social domains (ibid). Even though there are many ways of approaching 
the analysis of discourse, most approaches follow the four premises of social 
constructionism. The premises of social constructionism are influenced by French post-
structuralist theory that challenged the totalising and universal orientations of Marxism 
and psychoanalysis (ibid: 15). The first premise of the social-constructive foundation of 
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discourse is that our knowledge of the world cannot be interpreted as objective truths. 
The way we speak about the world, our identities and social relations do not present a 
neutral reflection of reality; in fact, discourses much rather creates and changes these 
perceptions of ourselves and our surroundings (ibid: 9). Reality is approached trough 
our creation of categories, thus making our knowledge and worldviews products of 
these categorisations (ibid: 13). The second premise of social construction is its 
historical and cultural relativity; in other words, the way we represent the world is 
subjected to historical and cultural confinements that changes in time and space (ibid: 
14). The third premise is the connection between knowledge and social processes as 
common truths and falsies are created and sustained by social interaction (ibid). Finally, 
there is a connection between knowledge and social action; in any given worldview, 
some actions are regarded as natural whilst others are regarded as unthinkable (ibid).      
 Discourse about ‘discourse’ in anthropology expanded in volume in the 
beginning of the 1970s. The term became relevant from two directions; it has become 
part of the language of both linguistic studies and cultural studies. Linguists focus on 
the structural elements of discursive flow, for example, how topics are introduced and 
controlled, interruption, and other devises that maintain discursive interaction. 
Anthropologists in general are more concerned with what these structures of discourse 
reveal about a ‘culture’ at large (Lindstrom 2003: 162). The second sort of discourse 
analysis more commonly applied to cultural studies, focuses more intently on discourse 
as a reference to particular areas of language use. This tradition of thinking incorporates 
three levels of meaning: ‘discourse is the act of talking or writing itself; it is a body of 
knowledge content; and it is a set of conditions and procedures that regulate how people 
appropriately may communicate and use that knowledge’ (ibid: 163). As opposed to the 
linguist focus on the elemental structures of conversational interaction, this ‘cultural 
approach’ focuses on the connections between the orders of communication, knowledge 
and power (ibid). Discursive analysis of this sort was largely pioneered by Michel 
Foucault who in The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) presented a programme that set 
out to describe discursive events in order to analyze how patterned discourse maintains 
particular ways of knowing and networks of power among those who have access to 
these particular ways of knowing (ibid). The latter form of discursive analysis is the one 
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I aim to utilize in this study. My approach to the Sourcebook has been to analyze the 
relationship between the textual constructions of meaning and interactional control; in 
other words, I have tried to explain instances of social control by looking at how 
participation is understood and translated when introduced to World Bank development 
practice. 
As earlier mentioned, this study is empirically based on a written text, and the 
use of text as a source of data should be commented on. Jørgensen & Phillips refers to 
the Fairclough criticism towards what he sees as the ‘simplified and superficial’ 
linguistic understanding of the relationship between text and society (2006: 78). He 
argues that textual analysis alone is not sufficient since it does not explain the 
connections between texts and socio-cultural processes and structures. Discourse 
analysis should thus incorporate a perspective that combines textual analysis and social 
analysis (ibid). A similar comment is presented in Exploring the Written (1994). This 
book is composed of a collection of anthropological contributions that aims to discuss 
the various interconnections between written products and social processes. More 
specifically, they tend to the multiplicity of written texts and discuss the ways in which 
texts can function as alternative and complementary sources of knowledge, sources of 
knowledge that may enhance anthropological understandings of how different 
discourses are produced, distributed and consumed in the societies under study (Archetti 
1994: 13). On the subject of ‘written identities’, Melhuus argues that texts (that usually 
are not the prerogative of anthropologists) only gains meaning in anthropological terms 
when it refers to a ‘lived experience’ beyond the text (ibid: 15). Both Fairclough and the 
anthropological perspectives on written texts, embrace textual analysis as a useful tool, 
but one that should not stand alone. Whereas Fairclough focuses his criticism towards 
linguistically orientated textual discourse analysis in general, and Exploring the Written 
focuses on the ‘complementary’ role of texts in anthropological analysis, Nustad 
focuses more specifically the inadequacies of development discourse analysis. He 
argues that much of the analysis directed towards development discourse tends to focus 
on the practitioners of development and thus neglect the reactions of the people that are 
to be developed (2004: 22). Nustad refers to Kiely’s argument that ‘post-development 
discourse tends to imply a passive Third World, simply having its strings pulled by an 
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all-powerful West’ (ibid). Nustad thus argues for a more actor-orientated approach to 
development discourse analysis, by grounding it in ‘the social reality from where the 
analysis began’ (ibid).     
 In the light of these criticisms, how then can I justify my own thesis, a study 
based solely on textual data? Moreover, to what extent can I counter Nustad’s criticism 
towards the general focus on practitioners in post-development analysis? Largely I 
cannot; because of the limitations of working primarily with a text, I cannot account for 
the reactions of the beneficiaries of development and their experiences of participating 
in a World Bank development initiative (other than the few participant statements at 
times presented in the Sourcebook). The Sourcebook does however, present an actor-
orientated perspective that I can incorporate into my analysis, through the case studies 
presented in Sharing Experiences. This study is not only concerned with ‘isolated 
discourse’, that is, as text, as language, as meaning; this study is also concerned with 
how discourse is materialized (meaning what texts, objects and people do) by looking at 
how the construction of meaning through written action influence social processes. The 
three case studies that I have focused on offer descriptions of how participation is 
practiced in World Bank development projects. In this thesis, I will study these 
descriptions in an effort to show how the knowledge about or meaning of stakeholder 
participation is produced or performed (Asdal: 27). 
My position in this thesis is not as an observer of the field (the field meaning the 
social process of participatory development), but as an observer of the discursive 
construction of the field. Moreover, I am an observer of the Sourcebook as a 
communicative event (2006: 80) that reflects action in terms of written text, but also 
how discourse is enabled textually. What the case studies offer in terms of an actor 
perspective is how the World Bank describes social processes of stakeholder interaction 
and participation as a strategic tool. By focusing on the textual description of the case 
studies, I am been able to analyze the discursive construction of participation and social 
processes, and the wider discursive practice within these constructions operate. 
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Approaching Power 
In Globalizing Development in Tanzania (2003), Green explores the standardization of 
development practice through the social processes of participation. She argues that this 
standardization is a consequence of the practices applied when development agencies 
transforms policy visions into manageable realities through projects subject to 
techniques involving organization and control (ibid: 102). Green writes that 
‘workshopping’ in Tanzanian development culture primarily functions as a social 
process with an emphasis on ‘professionalism’. Donor agencies expect from their 
participants to conform to the framework of these workshops, which functions as 
packages of input and output, and not to interfere with the ‘clear schedules and aim’ 
(ibid: 110). In this thesis, I will build on Green’s notion of ‘manageable realities’, and 
more specifically, on how discourses affect development activities as social processes. 
Especially two authors have influenced this endeavour, both theoretically and 
methodologically; two authors that both address the relationship between the 
construction of knowledge and practices: Bruno Latour and Michel Foucault.           
In Science in Action (2003), Latour describes the strategies used to solve what 
he calls the ‘quandary of the fact-builder’. Whenever a scientist or an engineer, wishes 
to prove the infallibility of a statement or an object, they are dependant on the 
behaviour of others. Their objective is to transform their claim into a ‘black box’. A 
black box is not merely a well-established fact or an unproblematic object; it is when a 
certain object or statement becomes an ‘automaton’, when all the elements within it 
begin to act as one, that a black box is born (ibid: 131). The movement of a statement 
or an artefact from claim to black box, will depend to some extent on the fact-builders 
own actions, yet to a much greater extent on the actions of others whom the fact-
builder have little control over. The construction of facts is thus a collective process; 
without the agreement of others, a statement is merely a claim, not a fact (ibid: 104). 
The solution sited above seems at first to be a contradiction; the enrolment of others 
endangers the statement or the object, as they are likely to transform its content beyond 
recognition. The very notion of involving others, limits the fact-builder’s degree of 
control. The solution to this contradiction is what Latour calls the central notion of 
translation (ibid: 108). I am not too concerned with Latour’s model in terms of 
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‘claims’, ‘facts’ and ‘black boxes’. I rather wish to utilize Latour’s model of translation 
to illustrate how and why the World Bank is able to manage the contents of the social 
systems they claim to place themselves within. I argue that Latour’s model allows a 
more explicit analysis of how participants are enrolled into collective processes and 
then controlled to achieve specific purposes and ends. According to Latour, this can be 
done by a series of strategic translations. Latour and the model of translation are never 
explicitly discursive; in fact, Latour expressed great scepticism towards the discursive 
deconstruction of meaning, arguing that discourses cannot be analyzed in isolation; 
discourses aren’t a world in themselves, but rather a part of the world (Asdal 2003: 27). 
However, by applying the model of translation to the participatory processes described 
in the Sourcebook, I have been able to identify the relationship between ‘ways of 
knowing’ and the effects that these ‘ways of knowing’ create. Latour’s model of 
translation thus offers a specific methodology in analyzing the ways knowledge is 
produced.         
Another important influence has been the works of Michel Foucault, and more 
specifically his notion of governmentality. Foucault is argued by many as one of the 
‘Fathers’ of discourse analysis and is frequently commented on, modified, criticised and 
referred to in most works of discourse analysis (Jørgensen & Phillips 2006: 21). 
Traditionally, Foucault’s work has been divided into an early ‘archaeological’ phase 
and a later ‘genealogical’ phase; however, these phases overlap each other. Foucault’s 
discursive theory is placed primarily within his ‘archaeological work’; what he was 
interested in is to identify ‘archeologically’, is the rules of which statements that are 
counted meaningful and true within a specific historic era (ibid). In Foucault’s later and 
more ‘genealogically’ approached work, he focused more specifically on the relations 
between power and knowledge. Instead of approaching agents and structures as primary 
categories, he focuses more specifically, on how power through discourse is spread 
across social practices (ibid).  
The term ‘governmentality’ was first formulated by Foucault at a lecture 
delivered at the Collège de France in February 1978, in part as a response to the 
ascendancy of economic neoliberalism in Western European politics. In this lecture, 
Foucault shifts his focus from the specialised practices and knowledge of the individual 
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person, to the exercise of political sovereignty over an entire population. More 
specifically, he addresses government as a practice enabled by a specific rationality, or 
by a succession of different rationalities (1994: xxiii). This rationality of government, or 
governmentality, marks the emergence of a new way of thinking about and exercising 
power in certain societies; governmentality address a form of power that is ‘bound up 
with the discovery of a new reality, the economy, and concerned with a new subject, the 
population’ (Dean 1999: 19). One of the most interesting elements on the rationality of 
government is Foucault’s recognition of liberalism as an innovation in the history of 
governmental rationality (1994: xxvii). Gordon writes: 
 
Liberalism advocates an ‘economic government’ – a government, in other words that, economizes 
on the use of resources and effort to achieve its ends, and more particularly, accepts that to govern 
well is to govern less (ibid: xxviii).  
   
In other words, liberalism offers a new way of looking at political knowledge, a way 
that redefines the role of the state. Here political knowledge is rather concerned with a 
new objective, social and economic reality that is distinct from and independent of the 
state (ibid).  
Foucault argues that the essential issue in the establishment of ‘the art of 
government’ is the introduction of economy into political practice; more specifically, 
Foucault writes that ‘the art of government’ is concerned with how to introduce 
economy, i.e. the correct way of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the 
family, to the management of the state (ibid: 207). ‘The art of government’ takes the 
shape of a ‘good father’; its role is to arrange things in such a way that it leads to a 
‘convenient’ end for the family, or the ‘population’ as a whole (ibid: 211). Examples of 
such convenient ends is the production of wealth and making sure that the population is 
provided with sufficient means of subsistence, which in turn enables them to multiply, 
and so on (ibid). To achieve these finalities, government must dispose things. Foucault 
places a special emphasis on the term ‘dispose’. Whereas sovereignty rests on the 
obedience of laws and thus the instrument of laws itself to achieve its aims, government 
is not a question of imposing law on men. ‘The art of government’ is about ‘disposing 
thing’, employing tactics rather than laws (in which laws themselves can be used as 
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tactics) to ‘arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such-
and-such ends may be achieved’ (ibid). Foucault continues this thought by stating that 
the finality of government ‘resides in the things it manages’ and ‘in the processes it 
directs’ (ibid). In other words, Foucault is concerned with how power works ‘through’ 
people, rather than the idea that power is imposed upon people. Thus, ‘governmentality’ 
addresses the ‘conduct of conduct’, in terms of both how we think about governing, but 
also how we govern ourselves.   
In Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (1999), Dean identifies a 
more general meaning associated with the term ‘governmentality’, one that deals with 
how we think about governing and with the different mentalities of government. Dean 
writes that the mentalities of government ‘emphasizes the way in which the thought 
involved in practices of government is collective and relatively taken for granted, i.e. 
not usually open to questioning by its practitioners’ (ibid: 16). Governmentality thus 
suggests a specific rationality (or rationalities) of government. Dean also formulates a 
way of analyzing government in this sense, by looking at the ‘organized practices’ 
through which we are governed and in which we govern ourselves; these practices are 
what Dean calls regimes of practices: 
 
These regimes…involve practices for the production of truth and knowledge [and] comprise 
multiple forms of practical, technical and calculative rationality (ibid: 18).  
 
In this study, I aim to apply Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’ to stakeholder 
participation as an organized practice. Whereas Latour’s model of translation offers a 
way of analyzing the rationalities of the World Bank by looking at the ways in which 
participation is translated, Foucault offers a perspective that can explain the powerful 
effects on social processes that these rationalities consequently create. In this sense, I 
will try to describe the linkage between the social production of participation and the 
production of knowledge that happens within the written experiences of the 
Sourcebook.  
The theoretical perspective of governmentality as offered by Foucault, also offers 
a methodological approach that seeks to uncover such instances of power. The analysis 
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of government is concerned with how rationalities and thoughts are embedded within 
programmes for the direction and reform of conduct; in other words, the analysis of 
government is not concerned with thought in terms of theoretical and abstract 
dimensions, but rather with ‘thought made practical and technical’ (Dean 1999: 18). I 
aim to illustrate the ways in which participation is rationalized and translated when 
introduced to a practical and technically orientated development reality. Moreover, I 
aim to discuss the interrelation between these translations and the effects that these 
translations have on the social processes described in the Sourcebook.          
 
Anthropology of Development and ‘the Radical View’ 
In the late 1980s, a group of authors writing from a poststructuralist perspective, began 
to approach development as a powerful discourse that helps shape the reality that 
development institutions claim to address, and discard alternative conceptions of the 
problem (Nustad 2004: 13). As opposed to the human-centred development perspective 
that seeks to redefine development, many poststructuralist authors reject the idea of 
development entirely. While some describes development as ‘the colonization of the 
mind’, others go even further and describes development activities as rape ‘either by 
force or by seduction’ (Baaz 2005: 149). Post-development discourse (of which I am 
familiar with and as Foucault would have argued that, I am largely ‘bound by’) offers 
various degrees of criticism towards development. A common stance of post-
development authors seems to be as ‘defenders of local people’ and many claims to 
speak on the behalf of citizens in development countries or at least those subjected to 
development policies and practices (Grillo 1997: 4). Ferguson’s The Anti-Politics 
Machine (2003) describes a project in which a decentralized and depoliticized 
development project eventually leads to the expansion and strengthening of state power 
in a formerly remote mountain area in Lesotho. Inasmuch, Ferguson is concerned with 
how a development initiative both intentionally and unintentionally affects social and 
economic change in a contemporary context. In Whose Development (2002), Crewe and 
Harrison comments on the ways in which indigenous or local knowledge is 
marginalized in development contexts; a marginalization related to the operational 
importance of ‘experts’ and ‘expert knowledge’ in development initiatives. Escobar 
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(1991), comments on the problematic relationship between development and 
anthropology, and especially towards anthropologists working within the development 
context, not as scientists, but as policy-makers and consultants. He sees development as 
a historically specific (and peculiar) experience, which must be defamiliarized so that 
its naturalness and hegemonic position can be suspended in the eyes of theorists and 
practitioners. (ibid: 676). Instead of contributing to development, Escobar argues that 
anthropology should contribute to the re-envisioning of ways of organizing societies 
and economies, and in the process ‘discover other ways of caring and of healing the 
ravages brought about by development in the Third World’ (ibid: 678).   
In The Paternalism of Partnership (2005), Baaz argues that there are problematic 
aspects of the post-development tradition; even though post-development and the 
activities they comment on are fundamental opposites, they still share one discursive 
strategy, i.e. the constructions of difference (ibid: 160). A common theme that operates 
within a lot of post-development literature is the binary opposition between the 
spiritual, grounded and altruistic ‘other’ and the West often characterized as non-
spiritual, individualistic and materialistic. The ‘third world’ is construed as an opposite 
of the West; the idealization of the idea that the West ‘works’ and the South ‘lives’, 
continues the idea of an active West and a passive South (ibid). A problematic 
consequence of this is that it implies a rhetoric that explains poverty as an internal 
problem, localized in the culture and mentality of ‘others’ (ibid). Such rhetoric was 
coincidentally also the fundamental premise of the modernization theory. Baaz is also 
critical towards the apparent de-legitimization of development that many post-
development authors express. The negative view of development as a ‘pathetic’ and 
potentially dangerous westernization of the ‘third world’ is according to Fagan in itself 
Eurocentric: 
 
Adopting the privilege of anti-development is not…politically or morally viable when sitting in 
an ‘overdeveloped’ social and individual location (ibid: 163). 
 
Most post-development contributions are arguably politically motivated, although in 
various degrees of radicalism. Such a political stance is natural surely, considering the 
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political potency of development as a social phenomenon. A problematic consequence 
of the more radical approaches to development can however, blur or dismiss the 
existence of alternative analytical approaches that challenge the usual conception of 
development as ‘domination’. Considering the apparent legitimacy of radical criticism 
within the post-development tradition, and the accessibility of such literature (some of 
which have been referred to in this thesis), I could have easily written a more radical 
criticism of World Bank development activities. However, this thesis differs 
thematically from the post-development contributions mentioned above; the limitations 
of my material do not allow me ‘to speak on behalf of local people’. This thesis is 
concerned with how government works through the practices of an international 
institution that deals with development. More importantly, how government works does 
not only reflect the relationship between ‘the powerful institution’ and ‘the powerless 
poor’; it reflects how power discourse operates through everyone within the context of 
stakeholder participation, including those that govern. 
 
Outline of the Thesis 
In this introduction, I have described the theme of this thesis and the problems I aim to 
discuss. I have also discussed the various historical perceptions of development and 
placed these parallel to the activities of the World Bank. I have also introduced the 
theoretical and methodological foundation that my thesis rests on.  
In chapter one, I will describe the aspects that the Sourcebook argues should be 
in place in order for participation to be initiated and practiced in development projects, 
and how these participatory concerns influence the succession of a World Bank 
sponsored project. The Nigeria: Women in Agriculture case illustrate how the World 
Bank views and manages two primary groups of stakeholders: the government and 
direct beneficiaries. The most interesting aspect of this case is the implied view of 
government and beneficiaries as bipolar groups, a view that has fundamental effects on 
the project as a space of knowledge and decision-making.    
In chapter two, I will focus on the Egypt:  Matruh Resource Management case 
that illustrates how a complex and disorderly Bedouin community stakeholder (as 
perceived and described in the Sourcebook) is transformed into an administratively and 
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organizationally adept participant. I will relate this transformation to the Sourcebook’s 
expressed emphasis on ‘building community capacity’ when dealing with beneficiary 
groups. In this chapter, I will also introduce the first part of Latour’s model of 
translation. With examples from both the Nigeria case and the Egypt case, I will 
identify the ways in which stakeholder participation is translated in order to enrol others 
by catering to their interests.  
In chapter three, I will focus on a case called Colombia: Electricity Sector 
Reform Program. The Colombia case offers an example of how representatives from 
different positions in government are brought together to attend a workshop in which 
decisions are to be generated collaborately. However, by utilizing the second part of 
Latour’s model of translation, I will identify the ways stakeholder participation is 
translated to control those enrolled. Such instances of control, is primarily identifiable 
on two accounts. The first is by looking at how conflicts are solved. The second and 
more important account of control is identifiable by looking at the role of the 
‘facilitator’.   
In the fourth chapter, I will discuss the relationship between stakeholder 
participation and perspectives of power. In the effort to identify Foucault’s notion of 
governmentality in the three examples of World Bank participatory efforts, I will 
conduct a closer examination of stakeholder participation as ‘organized practices’. By 
focusing on dimensions of visibility, technical aspects and rationality, I will discuss 
what kinds of knowledge that arise from and inform stakeholder participation as 
organized practices. Moreover, I will discuss the effects of these dimensions of 
rationality in the attempt to explain, not only how participatory processes are arranged 
in certain ways, but also why.     
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1   Managing Space  
 
 
Participation is a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over 
development initiatives, and the decisions and resources that affects them (1996: xi).  
 
In the participatory efforts of World Bank sponsored projects, ‘representation’ becomes 
especially interesting because of the inclusion of several interest groups, a central 
notion in the idea of stakeholder participation as defined above. In this chapter, I will 
focus on a case study that describes the participatory efforts of a World Bank task 
manager. The Nigeria: Women in Agriculture case, describes a project that sought to 
address the lacking inclusion of women farmers in agricultural extension programs 
funded by the Nigerian government. What this case study offers, is an example of how 
different stakeholders are understood and managed within the context of stakeholder 
participation. In this chapter, I will also identify three general concerns about 
participation expressed in the Sourcebook. These ‘participatory concerns’ are related to 
the proper management of stakeholders in participatory processes.   
The first concern is getting government support (ibid: 121). The Sourcebook 
states that governments’ stand on stakeholder participation is ‘critical’ and that the first 
important step in starting a participatory approached project is to get the support of the 
government (ibid). The second concern is called levelling techniques (ibid: 133). This 
concern comments on the difficulties of including direct beneficiaries (i.e. ‘the poor’) in 
participatory processes, and the measures that can be taken in order to make sure that 
such marginalized groups are heard (ibid). The third dimension is a continuation of the 
second dimension. Building community capacity constitutes a levelling technique on its 
own and one that is a clear indication of how beneficiary groups are perceived as 
participants in World Bank development projects (ibid: 133). 
 These three participatory concerns are arguably interrelated; furthermore, they 
fundamentally direct stakeholder participation as social processes. I will describe these 
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in greater lengths later in this chapter, but before that, I will focus on the first case study 
of this thesis as described in the Sourcebook; the Nigeria: Women in Agriculture case.     
 
Nigeria: Women in Agriculture 
A study financed by the United Nations Development Program revealed that women 
make up 60-80 percent of the agricultural labour force in Nigeria. However, agricultural 
extension services in Nigeria had traditionally focused on men and their farm 
production, thus excluding a large portion of the production force; as a consequence, 
women were receiving minimal assistance and information from extension agents. As 
task manager for the Women in Agriculture Program, Katrine Saito worked with Bank 
staff in developing program guidelines that assist ‘women farmers’ in Nigeria (ibid: 
90). In an attempt to counter this issue, the Nigerian government in cooperation with 
the World Bank, created Women in Agriculture (WIA) programs within the already 
existing agricultural development programs (ADPs). These programs sought to address 
‘the gender-related deficiencies within the existing extension program’ (ibid: 89). A 
pilot focusing especially on women’s activities was initiated to supplement the ongoing 
sector, as well as to gain insights in how to improve extension services for Nigerian 
women farmers.     
 The task manager’s first major task was to bring all the relevant stakeholders 
together. The planning of a ‘National Planning Workshop’ would bring representatives 
from different WIA initiatives together, and allow them to share experiences and to 
come up with a three-year action plan for each state. The director of Nigeria’s Federal 
Agriculture Coordinating Unit (FACU) was supportive of the idea that local level 
stakeholders would participate in the workshop alongside national and state agriculture 
officials and Bank staff. The director felt that a better understanding of women’s 
constraints at the local level would best be achieved by ‘broadening the policy dialogue 
and bringing a range of different stakeholders into the learning and decision-making 
process’ (ibid: 90).  
 However, in the workshop planning process, a sense of uncertainty arose in 
relation to the direct inclusion of women farmers. The task manager admittingly stated 
that women farmers were voiceless, especially in relation to agricultural projects and 
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policies, but for them to participate directly could be problematic. One reason given 
was the volatile political situation in the country at the time, as strikes and riots made 
in-country travel difficult. Another reason was the limited access to rural areas, as 
public transportation was unreliable. According to the task manager, getting permission 
from their husbands and travelling with children would also constitute obstacles. In 
addition to these political, social and infrastructural barriers, the task manager and their 
Nigerian counterparts expressed concerns about the ‘effectiveness’ of women farmers 
as participants in the workshop, here described as a ‘high-level forum’: 
 
This would be an entirely new and potentially overwhelming situation for them in which they 
would have to interact with powerful stakeholders such as ministers and senior government 
officials. We were also uncertain of their ability to articulate their problems and needs effectively 
in this sort of context (ibid: 90). 
 
The solution to this concern would be the inclusion of ‘female extension agents’ whom 
interacted with women farmers on a regular basis. According to the task manager, these 
women were ‘accustomed to working with male bureaucrats, travelling alone, and were 
better able to articulate constraints faced by women farmers and propose solutions on 
their behalf’ (ibid). Whether these women were representative of women farmers, the 
task manager commented that:   
 
…although it should never be assumed that certain groups will accurately represent the interests 
of others, in this case, we had every reason to believe that female extension agents would serve as 
reliable proxies (ibid). 
 
The workshop was to be held in July 1989, but due to demonstrations against the 
Nigerian government and an attempted coup in Lagos, the Bank staff was uncertain 
about the attendance of the workshop. However, some sixty-four participants, mostly 
women, from all over Nigeria made their way to the workshop. The delegates were 
primarily the female heads of WIA units, chief extension officers and ADP 
(Agricultural Development Projects) managers, whom were mostly male. In addition, 
senior ministers and officials from the sponsoring government departments were also 
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present, and of course, the Bank, represented by project division and resident mission 
staff (ibid: 91). After the opening remarks by key officials attending the workshop, the 
first day was devoted to defining the problems, whereas each WIA representative were 
given time to present and identify problems that were encountered by women in their 
ADPs respectively. The task manager was clearly impressed by the results: 
 
Believe me when I tell you that these women were impressive! They were well informed, 
dedicated, dynamic and articulate. They all came with prepared presentations and they blew us 
away...The excitement and energy in the room was almost tangible (ibid). 
 
The problems and constraints expressed in these presentations were then discussed in 
plenary. On the second day of the workshop, the attendants were divided into smaller 
groups, to undertake strategic and tactical planning. They were asked to come up with 
three-year action plans for integrating women farmers into the core of ADP activities. 
Each team was made up of three to four state ADPs, and each state ADP was 
represented by at least one WIA person and one senior ADP manager. The task 
manager stated that they ‘felt it was critical to have ADP managers involved to build 
ownership of the plans by management’ (ibid).  
 The technical specialists, that is, the Bank staff, government officials and 
resident staff served as resource people, going from group to group while listening and 
giving advice. The task manager described the proceedings as following:  
 
The whole process was informal. We all huddled around tables and worked out the three-year 
plans with little more than pencils and paper (ibid). 
 
The task manager argued that the workshop certainly could be described as 
collaborative decision-making as ‘participants were actively brainstorming, discussing 
and exchanging all sorts of ideas’ (ibid). Experiences were shared between the 
participants, and appropriate technology and innovations were exchanged among the 
female extension agents:  
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It was obvious that a lot of knowledge was floating around at this workshop – it was just a matter 
of pulling it together. We found that combining this local knowledge and creativity with the 
technical expertise of the government and Bank worked extremely well in producing plans that 
were locally tailored, financially viable, and technically sound (ibid).   
 
The task manager also described the group dynamics at the workshop. What she found 
interesting about working in small groups was that it broke the formal office hierarchy 
that existed between the female extension agents and their ADP managers, who were 
male. This she related to the pressure the participants were faced with; each team was to 
prepare presentations that would be performed in front of everyone and that they 
obviously wanted to make a good impression. According to the task manager, the 
forced cooperation and direct interaction between the female agents and male 
managers, broadened the participants’ view of each other, and helped them realize that 
they relied on each other ‘to get the job done’: 
 
Although the women could put forth their perspectives based on first-hand experiences in the 
field, managers could put a budgetary perspective on solutions being proposed, while gaining an 
understanding of the impact their decisions would have on women farmers (ibid). 
 
On the last day of the workshop, each ADP presented their action plans; this time 
however, presentations were made by the program managers. Again, the task manager 
emphasized the need for management ownership of the plan. Without their personal 
involvement and commitment, the likelihood of changes being implemented was 
minimal:  
 
Bringing about change in favour of women farmers required ownership by both men and women 
at all levels. We knew from past experience that sensitizing or empowering one set of 
stakeholders to take action while leaving other key players out of the process could lead to 
problems down the road, or worse, no action at all (ibid: 92). 
 
On reflection, the task manager stated that the momentum created by the workshop was 
difficult to stop and that the program had benefited both the agricultural sector and the 
activities of rural women (ibid: 94). It had created a greater awareness of the needs of 
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these women among policy makers, provided them with new technologies and increased 
the percentage of women reached by the extension system. The task manager 
comments: 
 
It is also heartening to see that women farmers now regularly visit the ADP headquarters to 
express their grievances and dissatisfaction about such things as the method of fertilizer 
distribution, for example. Until recently, women were rarely heard – only seen – and in this sense 
the WIA program has dramatically increased their voice and participation (ibid). 
 
The Nigeria case offers an example that illustrates the tensions between government 
participation and beneficiary participation in a World Bank development projects, and 
how the inclusion of one stakeholder group consequently resulted in the exclusion of 
another. How the task manager rationalized the exclusion of the direct beneficiaries can 
be further understood by looking closer at what I called ‘participatory concerns’ in the 
introduction of this chapter. The first concern is getting government support. 
      
Getting Government Support 
According to the Sourcebook, the first important step when initiating participatory 
approaches to development is ‘getting government support’ (ibid: 121). To gain 
government support, task managers use different types of persuasion, including 
initiating pilot and field visits to sustain dialogues, orientation workshops and building 
alliances with central government officials that support a participatory approach. How 
governments stand in relation to stakeholder participation is characterized as ‘critical’:  
 
Without government support, the Bank can do little to initiate, broaden and sustain 
participation…Bank task managers must obtain government support to work in a participatory 
manner (ibid: 122). 
 
The Sourcebook states that this does not mean that the Bank should be passive, but 
rather that government consent is a required necessity. In most cases, getting 
government support is not a problem. In some cases, governments call for participatory 
approaches (ibid). As we saw in the Nigeria case, the government became aware of the 
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study revealing that women farmers was being excluded from agricultural extension 
services; their response was to create the ‘Women in Agriculture’ program in 
collaboration with the World Bank. In this case, government was positive towards 
participating with female delegates and jointly designed the participatory efforts from 
the beginning.  
 The Sourcebook regards governments as a ‘primary group’ (ibid: 125). As a 
primary group, the government is always regarded as a key stakeholder, and is always 
the first and obvious stakeholder that task managers work with. The Sourcebook 
explains this by stating ‘the government is a Bank shareholder, the primary decision-
maker and implementer of policies and projects, and the one who repays the Bank loan 
or credit (ibid). Therefore, a core ministry is always involved, such as finance, planning, 
and the central bank or similar ministries; often other officials from core and line 
ministries, in addition to officials from provincial or local authorities have a stake in 
certain activities (ibid). As described in the Nigeria case, the government was 
represented by senior ministers and officials from the Agricultural Department during 
the participatory process, as well as state employed extension agents. 
Governments are also viewed as important in terms of identifying other 
stakeholders. The process of identifying relevant stakeholders is usually done by Bank 
staff in collaboration with governments by asking questions and seeking answers from 
both in country and Bank sources (ibid). In the Nigeria case, the task manager and the 
Bank staff initiated a pilot program where they tested out a number of different 
approaches on representatives from ADPs. Through this pilot, they learned that the 
different WIA initiatives had achieved highly different results. The Bank approached 
the head of FACU with the idea of bringing a number of representatives from the 
different WIAs together under the assumption that a workshop could enable them to 
share experiences and thus bring a higher degree of efficiency back to their respective 
programs.  
The first and necessary step in achieving and initiating participation is therefore 
to secure government approval of working in a participatory manner and their 
involvement as participants; in addition, the inclusion of government is also important 
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in terms of identifying other stakeholders. The second participatory concern is directly 
connected to the first and is called levelling techniques.  
 
Levelling Techniques 
The Sourcebook states that ‘those directly affected by a proposed intervention are 
clearly among the key stakeholders. They are the ones who stand to benefit or lose from 
Bank-supported operations or who warrant redress from any negative effects of such 
operation’ (ibid: 126). The poor and marginalized are often part of this group. The 
Sourcebook states that ‘voiceless’ groups, such as the women farmers in the Nigeria 
case, often are the stakeholders whose interests are critical to the success and 
sustainability of Bank-supported programs. However, it is often these groups of 
stakeholders that task managers find most difficult to identify and involve in 
participatory processes (ibid). This is attributed to the fact that when stakeholders such 
as government officials are included in participatory processes, the differences in power 
between stakeholders, makes interaction between groups difficult (ibid: 132). Kothari 
argues this attribution rests on a common assumption in participatory methodology; 
those who wield power are usually those located at the institutional centre, whilst those 
who are subjected to power are those located at the local level (2001: 140).  
When stronger and more established stakeholders are engaged in participatory 
processes with weaker, less organized groups, Bank task managers have made use of 
different techniques in order to ‘level’ these differences (1996: 132). One way of 
levelling differences is by ‘mandating representation’; i.e. the Bank and sponsors ensure 
that certain groups participate as ‘a rule of the game’. In such cases, the participation of 
voiceless groups is incorporated into the design of the project. In the Benin Health 
example, the possibility of women being left out was foreseen by the project managers, 
and the formation of a village health committee consisting of at least one mother from 
each of the respective villages in the area, was planned in the design phase (ibid: 133). 
In the Chad Education example however, the issue of participation by women was not 
addressed, resulting in that no women showed up at the national participatory planning 
workshop (ibid).    
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Another levelling technique is to ‘organize separate events’ (ibid); the problems 
that may arise when marginalized groups are expected to participate and interact with 
powerful government officials may be solved by arranging separate and less 
intimidating participatory events for the ‘voiceless’. In the Philippines Integrated 
Protected Areas example, it was discovered that workshops were being dominated by 
local authorities and NGOs at the expense of indigenous communities. In this case it 
was decided that tribal groups should have separate workshops; other parties would be 
present, but as ‘observers only’ (ibid). Power differences can also be levelled by the use 
of ‘participatory techniques’. One such technique is called ‘level interactions’. Level 
interactions constitute the division of participants into small groups where participants 
are expected to comply with certain ‘behavioural rules’: 
 
‘Levelling’ is facilitated when people listen to or observe quietly what others say without 
criticism or opposition. In the Egypt Resource Management example, outsiders watched 
respectfully as the Bedouins drew maps on the ground. Quiet observation encouraged the 
‘voiceless’ to express themselves through non-verbal representations (ibid: 133).  
 
As seen in the Nigeria case, the use of surrogates was the technique applied to level 
power in the context of participatory decision-making. The Sourcebook defines 
surrogates as ‘any group or individual who has close links to the affected population 
and is capable of representing their views and interests during participatory planning’ 
(ibid: 131). In the Nigeria case, the task manager and the Nigerian government felt that 
the inclusion of women farmers could be problematic, since ‘women farmers might feel 
intimidated and overwhelmed and might not be able to articulate their needs effectively’ 
(ibid: 134). Instead, female extension agents were brought in as ‘reasonable substitutes’ 
under the assumption that they had the necessary experience of working with male 
bureaucrats and local government officials, thus making it ‘easier for them to speak to 
more powerful stakeholders and participate more equally…on behalf of farmwomen’ 
(ibid). 
 The third concern is merely a continuation of the second concern, as it constitutes 
a separate technique that can be utilized when trying to ‘level power’ in participatory 
processes. However, I feel that this specific participatory technique is essential in 
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understanding how beneficiary groups are viewed by the World Bank and should thus 
be commented on separately. 
 
Building Community Capacity 
As expressed earlier, Bank representatives express difficulty in involving the 
marginalized poor because of the many barriers that prevent them from having any real 
stake in development activities. The first and foremost barrier is the involvement of 
powerful government officials as their inclusion is viewed as an absolute necessity in 
World Bank development projects. In the Nigeria case, women farmers were excluded 
under the assumption that the participation of powerful officials could be experienced as 
‘intimidating’ and ‘overwhelming’ and that they would not be able to express their 
needs efficiently. Power differences are one aspect that limits the poor opportunities in 
participatory processes. Another barrier that complicates the participation of the poor in 
World Bank projects is the ‘weak’ structures commonly applied to poor communities:    
 
Some groups – especially the very poor, women, indigenous people or others who may not be 
fully mobilized – may not have the organizational or financial wherewithal to participate 
effectively (ibid: 132).  
 
When designing ‘poverty-focused initiatives’ task managers have found it necessary get 
an overview of the organizational characteristics of poor communities, i.e. the 
organizational structure in which community decisions are made (ibid: 152). Many 
informal organizations with different functions operate within such communities. The 
Sourcebook states that it is important to identify such ‘invisible groups’:   
  
Some of the most active community organizations are informal. They are not listed in any 
documents, and they may be unknown even to people who are familiar with the communities 
(ibid) 
 
The identification of existing organizations in these communities is explained as 
important when trying to build community capacity, as it is often through such 
organizations that demands are expressed, participatory processes organized and 
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development services are delivered. In fact, many projects works through existing 
community organizations and are built on the already established, collaborative 
experience of these groups (ibid). The World Bank must therefore identify these 
‘invisible’ and non-documented institutions within the communities by formalizing 
them (ibid). By increasing their capacity to interact efficiently within the participatory 
process, they increase their visibility and thus their ability to participate directly in 
development projects.  
The Sourcebook states that when working with local groups project designers 
might face potential pitfalls when creating the institutional structure ‘without paying 
adequate attention to the capability, knowledge and technical skills the group will 
require’ (ibid: 154). Often, newly established groups have failed because too much was 
expected from them too soon; also, attempts to modify the form or function of existing 
groups to serve project needs, does not always work:  
 
Community groups, in addition to lacking sufficient funds to begin their own development 
efforts, frequently lack adequate organizational, administrative, and technical skills to design and 
implement such activities (ibid). 
 
‘Building community capacity’ is not explicitly relevant to the participatory process 
described in the Nigeria case, but will be more extensively applied to a different case 
study presented in the next chapter of this thesis. However, the operational insistence on 
building community capacity illustrates an important implication, as it indicates a view 
of beneficiary groups as collective entities. This collectivization of direct beneficiaries 
is also evident in the Nigeria case; the task manager questioned the inclusion of the 
women farmers, referring to their inadequacies in terms of ‘efficient articulation’ and 
the fact that interacting with government officials could be an ‘intimidating’ and 
‘overwhelming’ experience. The task manager showed no consideration towards the 
variety of individual personalities existing within the beneficiary group. Arguably, a 
closer inspection of women farmers as a group (or of any group of people for that 
matter) would reveal simply that some people are more articulate than others, and that 
some people are harder to ‘intimidate’ and ‘overwhelm’ than others. However, the task 
 36 
manager applied these perceived characteristics to the women farmers as a collective 
entity, which consequently resulted in their exclusion as a collective entity.    
 
Efficient Participation 
In this chapter, I have described a participatory process in which stakeholder groups are 
either included or excluded as participants in a World Bank development project. The 
three participatory concerns (and especially the first two), has had important effects on 
the participatory process described in the Nigeria case. First, Bank sponsored projects 
always include governments in participatory processes. As described in the concern of 
‘getting government support’, government inclusion is rationalized in terms of ‘project 
sustainability’. Accordingly, Bank-sponsored development projects does not resemble 
so-called ‘grass-root projects’ proven popular especially in certain NGO activities. Such 
projects emphasize the direct participation between beneficiaries and the NGO outside 
of government influence or involvement; these projects are what the Sourcebook 
defines as ‘popular participation’ (ibid: 6). In World Bank development processes of 
stakeholder participation, governments are always included and perceived as an 
absolute necessity. The most important effect of government inclusion is the 
fundamental premise it lays for the continuing events of a participatory approached 
development projects. The first concern, i.e. ‘getting government support’ is thus 
intrinsically linked to the second concern of ‘levelling techniques’. Since government is 
included from the beginning, project managers must apply different levelling techniques 
to ensure that other, less powerful stakeholders can be heard as participants in decision-
making processes. In the Nigeria case, we saw how women farmers were replaced by 
female external agents to ‘level’ the interaction between participants in the National 
Planning Workshop.  
To ‘level’ interaction is also viewed as important in order to increase project 
efficiency and to achieve ‘good results’. In the Nigeria case, women farmers were 
excluded on the grounds of logistical infeasibility, but more importantly, because of a 
lacking ability to articulate their needs ‘efficiently’ in a forum consisting of government 
staff and officials. In this specific case, the inclusion of government created a premise 
that effectively excluded the women farmers. It was not that the beneficiaries lacked 
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knowledge, but that they lacked the ability to articulate this knowledge efficiently when 
interacting directly with government participants. Thus, female external agents were 
brought in to replace them and to speak on their behalf. Although the involvement of 
direct beneficiaries in development projects are always wanted to secure sustainability, 
the Sourcebook admits that, the inclusion of these groups often is difficult and 
sometimes ‘inappropriate’. One of the most important reasons explaining this limitation 
is precisely the ever-presence of government officials and staff as participants; the 
direct interaction between powerful stakeholders and ‘weaker and less organized 
groups’ (1996: 132) is thus viewed as a threat to the overall efficiency of the 
participatory approach. In the Nigeria case, the workshop was described as a ‘high-level 
forum’, referring to the government officials that would participate. Because of this, the 
task manager felt uncertain about the degree in which women farmers were able to 
‘articulate their problems and needs effectively in this sort of context’ (ibid: 90). 
Consequently, the task manager decided instead to involve women farmers indirectly by 
including female extension agents, under the assumption that they were ‘better able to 
articulate constraints faced by women farmers and propose solutions on their behalf 
(ibid). In the Nigeria case, stakeholders were included and excluded based on a 
preferred capability of ‘articulation’, an expression that implies a notion of 
‘participatory efficiency’ as an essential part in achieving ‘good results’. I argue that the 
different degrees to which stakeholders are included in the decision-making process are 
related to their relevance. In the Nigeria case, being a stakeholder is not necessarily the 
same as being a relevant stakeholder, at least not in terms of direct participation. The 
Sourcebook states that: 
 
Once a participatory stance is taken, getting the right stakeholders becomes essential to producing 
good results. Not all parties…can automatically be assumed relevant (ibid: 125). 
 
This statement has a couple of implications. First, it divides between the right and 
relevant stakeholders, and less relevant stakeholders. Second, this division is done as a 
means to achieve ‘good results’. I argue that the inclusion and exclusion of participants 
in the Nigeria case are done according to predetermined ideas of what results a 
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development project should produce. What exactly does ‘good results’ mean in this 
specific case? This is not specifically defined in the Nigeria case, but one way of 
interpreting ‘good results’ is by applying the notion of dual logic to the participatory 
efforts (Mosse 2001: 25). Mosse argues that there is a characteristic ‘dual logic’ of 
participation, which is explained as a product of the tensions between established 
demands and donor demands for participation. The first logic is the emphasis on ‘local-
level integrated planning and local capacity building’, whilst the second logic is 
concerned with the importance of ‘operational delivery’ (ibid: 25). The first logic 
juxtaposes project success with the demand that programme activities should be seen 
and understood as participatory. This logic is certainly evident in the Nigeria case as it 
offers several statements that describe the program as a thoroughly participatory project. 
First, the project manager defended the decision of excluding women farmers from the 
decision-making process, arguing that the participatory efforts had not been 
significantly weakened by the inclusion of surrogates:  
 
We felt confident that these women extension agents were well qualified to represent the interests 
of women farmers because they were from the same areas and often were farmers themselves 
(1996: 90). 
  
The task manager’s description of the National Planning Workshop also emphasized the 
participatory nature of the project, stating that ‘participants were actively brainstorming, 
discussing and exchanging all sorts of ideas’ (ibid: 91). On reflection, the task manager 
also stated that ‘until recently, women were rarely heard – only seen – and in this sense 
the WIA program has dramatically increased their voice and participation’ (ibid: 94). 
These statements describe the proceedings of the project as fully and successfully 
participatory.  
The second logic emphasizes ‘upward accountability, proper use of funds, and the 
planning and delivery of quality programmes’ (2001: 25). In other words, the second 
logic is concerned with the institutional and organizational demands of operational 
delivery. Mosse argues that there is an element of conflict between these to logics, 
stating that the ideals of participation are contradicting the World Bank’s basic 
operating procedures (ibid: 27). This conflict between participation and operating 
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procedures is especially apparent in a statement offered by the task manager of the Lao: 
Health System Reform example; in this case, the task manager encountered difficulties 
when trying to formulate organizational reports that justifiably expressed ‘the spirit of 
the participation mode and conveyed the essence of the participatory process used’ 
(1996: 65). He continues: 
 
I kept falling back into old habits and had to struggle to bridge the gap between participatory 
language – with less precision and more flexibility – and Bank standards, which demanded a 
higher degree of certainty and precise, hard numbers (ibid: 65). 
 
In the Nigeria case, the operational demands of delivery are present in the explanation 
for and consequently inclusion of surrogates. The female extension agents were brought 
into the participatory process, replacing the direct beneficiaries that were seen as 
lacking the ability to express their needs efficiently. To possess an ‘efficient language’ 
is thus considered a quality that strengthens the ‘delivery’ aspect of World Bank 
initiated projects. In addition, the inclusion of surrogates is directly related to the 
participation of government officials. Thus, the emphasis on operational delivery also 
explains the importance of government involvement in participatory processes, 
especially in terms of the knowledge they bring with them as participants. In 
Reflections: What is Participation? the following is stated: 
 
The stakeholders contribute their experience and expertise – for instance, the experience of what 
it is to be poor or female or the expertise to develop specifications for a new road or educational 
program (ibid: 5) 
 
This statement indicates a division in what sort of knowledge different stakeholders 
bring into a participatory process. First, it implies that direct beneficiaries contribute 
‘experiences’ and thus provide other stakeholders with an increased understanding of 
their situation. Another form of knowledge is ‘expertise’, i.e. the technical knowledge 
that can help improve the situation of direct beneficiaries. This division of knowledge is 
also explicitly identifiable in the Nigeria case. When the task manager commented on 
the workshop as a ‘space of knowledge’, he stated the following: 
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Combining this local knowledge and creativity [of the female external agents] with the technical 
expertise of the government and Bank worked extremely well in producing plans that were locally 
tailored, financially viable, and technically sound (ibid: 91).   
 
This statement has two important implications. First, it comments on the fact that ‘the 
technical expertise’ of government and Bank staff produced ‘financially viable and 
technically sound’ plans. The emphasis on the financial importance of government 
inclusion is further supported when the task manager stated that ‘managers could put a 
budgetary perspective on solutions being proposed’ (ibid). Second, it comments on role 
of surrogates as representatives of ‘local knowledge and creativity’. An interesting 
aspect of the use of surrogates is that it apparently bridges the gap between the 
perception of ‘soft’ and flexible participation and the ‘hard’ technical and 
administrative orientation of the Bank’s standards of operational delivery. In the view 
of the World Bank, the use of female extension agents simultaneously meets the 
requirements of participation (as extension agents are seen as viable representatives of 
direct beneficiaries) and the organizational demands for delivery (as they possess 
qualities that enable them to participate efficiently). The workshop as a space in which 
decisions are made collaboratively is in itself viewed as participatory, but the content of 
this space is equally important as it combines ‘local knowledge’ with the financial and 
technical orientated knowledge of government representatives and Bank staff. The 
surrogates in the Nigeria case thus functions as a sort of missing link that ‘smoothens’ 
out the contradictions of the dual logic, and secures a ‘good result’ by making sure that 
both participation and delivery have been achieved.  
 
Efficient Participation as a ‘Purification of Space’ 
The most eminent feature of the Nigeria case is the decision in which the direct 
beneficiaries, i.e. the women farmers were excluded as direct participants. The 
Sourcebook seems to express a view of government and direct beneficiaries as bipolar 
groups, as stakeholders who mutually exclude each other from the possibility of 
cooperation and participation. The main explanation given for this bipolar view of 
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government and direct beneficiaries seems to lie with the notion that the two groups 
inhabit different capabilities in terms of ‘efficient participation’. First, there is an 
emphasis on the personal involvement of government employed program managers. 
Without their commitment, the task manager felt that implementation would face 
difficulties. Their involvement was also important in bringing a budgetary perspective 
on the solutions that were proposed (ibid: 91). Secondly, as a direct consequence of 
government participation, the task manager felt uncertain about directly involving 
beneficiary groups, as women farmers were seen as unable ‘to articulate their problems 
and needs effectively’ in what was described as a ‘high-level forum’ (ibid: 90). Thus, 
female external agents were brought in as ‘surrogates’. In Participation: the New 
Tyranny (2001), Kothari argues that ‘there is a purification of space by the exclusion or 
rejection of certain people and certain forms of knowledge’ (ibid: 147). Kothari 
continues: 
 
The methodological tools and techniques of participatory development [such as the workshop as a 
decision-making process]…require a purification or cleaning up of knowledge and experience: a 
tidying up…through the exclusion of anything that is messy or does not fit…structured 
representations (ibid). 
 
I argue that this sense of purifying space is evident in the Nigeria case. ‘Purification’ 
was achieved by excluding ‘inefficient’ women farmers from the workshop as a ‘space 
of knowledge’. By replacing women farmers with female extension workers, the task 
manager felt that the dynamic interaction between participants would be more ‘levelled’ 
and enable a more efficient participatory process. I argue that the workshop as an arena 
of participation and knowledge is ‘purified’ through the selection process of 
stakeholders; this purification excludes or includes stakeholders based on their 
capability of ‘efficiently articulating knowledge’ in the form of ideas, experiences and 
solutions. The women farmers in the Nigeria case were seen unfit as direct participants 
and was thus excluded from the workshop as a space of knowledge and decision-
making, because of the operational demands of the World Bank. 
In this chapter, I have explained how the management of space was done through 
the exclusion of a beneficiary group. In the next chapter, I will try to illustrate how the 
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inclusion of a beneficiary group is managed by the World Bank to achieve a similar 
sense of order and efficiency.   
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2   Managing the Social 
 
 
A city map that aspired to represent every traffic light, every pothole, every building, and very 
bush and tree in every park would threaten to become as complex as the city that it depicted. And 
it would certainly defeat the purpose of mapping, which is to abstract and summarize. A map is an 
instrument designed for a purpose. We may judge that purpose noble or morally offensive, but the 
map itself either serves or fails to serve its intended use (Scott 1998: 87). 
 
Scott writes that the function of the map is to simplify the immense three-dimensional 
complexity of the city; the map abstracts and summarizes the complexity of reality, thus 
making these realities more manageable (1998: 97). I argue that the selection process of 
stakeholders as described in the Nigeria case follows a similar logic. I view the process 
of inclusion and exclusion as a form of ‘mapping’ that narrows the field of actors, thus 
making the process of participation more manageable. By removing the ‘odd man out’, 
the women farmers, and replacing them with surrogates, the female extension agents, 
the World Bank managed both participatory space and content in order to achieve 
specific ends. In this chapter, I aim to continue the argument that participation is 
understood in ways that in effect simplifies and manages the complex reality of 
development as a social process. Whereas the Nigeria case illustrated how the exclusion 
of direct beneficiaries resulted in a more manageable and homogenized workshop, the 
Egypt case offers an example of how a beneficiary community participates directly in a 
World Bank development project. The task manager of the Egypt:  Matruh Resource 
Management Project set out to empower a Bedouin community through the extensive 
community mapping known as ‘Participatory Rural Appraisement’ (PRA). The Egypt 
case describes a project in which there is a high degree of interaction between 
beneficiaries and other stakeholders. I argue that this example presents a case in which 
purification and management is not achieved through the exclusion of beneficiary 
stakeholders, but rather through the management of beneficiary stakeholders as 
participants. 
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Egypt: Matruh Resource Management 
In late 1990, the World Bank was approached by the Egyptian government to help 
identify ways to improve agriculture in the Matruh Governorate, especially in relation 
to poor and remote farmers in the area. The area was inhabited by 250 000 people, 85 % 
of whom were Bedouins, who according to the Sourcebook were ‘among the poorest 
and most vulnerable of Egyptians’ (1996: 47). In October 1990 whilst conducting an 
identification mission in the Governorate, the task manager Bachir Souhlal noted that 
Bedouins no longer were nomadic, as they had accepted a government program to settle 
into a more sedentary lifestyle. One of the identified problems was overgrazing, and in 
general, ‘environmental degradation and poor management practices’ was evident 
everywhere (ibid: 48). The task manager realized ‘by intuition’ that a traditional 
livestock project would not suffice and that all stakeholders had to make an effort 
towards a more efficient use of resource management. The problems of the Matruh 
region could not be solved by technical solutions, but rather through a change in 
‘behaviour’: 
 
Local people would have to change the way they behaved, individually and collectively. 
Government would have to learn how to work with the local people and develop their trust and 
confidence. Finally, the Bank would have to learn how to contribute its knowledge and resources 
to fit what the local people were capable of and willing to do (ibid). 
 
The best way to address these ‘behavioural problems’ would be to let the local people 
do the ‘actual work of identification and preparation, instead of a team of external 
agents’ (ibid). The project started with the formation of a local task force, which 
consisted of ten people from central government, twenty from local government and ten 
from the Bedouin community. The latter group was chosen by the local authorities 
based on the individuals’ positions in their respective communities. A British consulting 
firm was hired to assist the task force with their work. The task force was the divided 
into seven groups, which set out to learn ‘everything about the governorate and its 
people’ (ibid). One aspect of this learning was the government’s construction of a 
library, collecting texts covering geography, topography, economies, history and 
culture. However, the task manager felt that this alone was not sufficient; the task force 
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would also make use of a technique called ‘PRA’. Francis writes that a key 
characteristic of the World Bank methodological approaches to participation is that they 
are ‘justified in terms of the short-comings of conventional development planning 
methods, which are seen as lacking in a ‘human’ or ‘social’ dimension’ (2001: 72). In 
an effort to increase the human and social aspects of participatory efforts there is 
therefore an expressed emphasis on incorporating the ‘emic’ view in participatory 
efforts (ibid: 72). Accordingly, the seven groups comprising task force would thus 
utilize different participatory techniques in order to map the different perceptions, 
values and priorities of the local population, over a period of three months.   
One way of collecting data was through ‘semi-structured interviewing’. A sub-
team of the task force conducted guided interviews, usually a group of households 
together. Only some topics were predetermined, leaving room for local people to talk 
about their specific interests. These interviews provided data about the households; how 
many people the households consisted of, assets they owned, activities they engaged in 
etc. This kind of data collection also contributed to ‘a feeling for and understanding of 
the other, thereby generating vital insights’ (1996: 49). Another way of collecting data 
was through ‘participatory mapping’; creating maps collaboratively with local people 
allowed project designers to recognize spatial relationships, differences in farming 
practices and pinpoint constraints (ibid). ‘Transect walks’ was a device that ensured an 
exploration and understanding of the spatial differences of the area being studied. The 
group walked to the periphery of the settlement, along with selected locals, observing 
differences in land use, vegetation, livestock and so forth. The task manager stated that 
‘the local people did the observing while the team recorded the observations because 
local people always see things outsiders are likely to miss’ (ibid). These observations 
were then used in the construction of a transect diagram, a stylized representation of the 
area. Different ‘seasonal calendars’ were also formulated, which focused on local 
livelihood systems. These calendars were created in meetings composed of several 
households, on the spot and in front of the groups, so that data checking occurred 
immediately. The task force also used a technique called ‘matrix ranking’; this 
technique enabled the team to learn what the Bedouins thought about particular matters 
in both absolute and relative terms. The task force formulated a list of measures in 
 46 
which the locals would judge, for example possible project activities. This exercise was 
done a number of times with groups representing different tribes, areas and wealth, 
which helped the task force to better focus on the poorer areas. The task manager stated 
that ‘these exercises often turned into brain-storming sessions; team-members became 
active participants, offering at times concepts and suggestions that were new to the 
Bedouins’ (ibid). 
The task manager stated that it took about one year to prepare a project based on 
the data they had collected through the PRA method. The project would eventually 
focus on natural resource management to preserve water, land and vegetation, adaptive 
research on dry land farming and livestock production systems, and rural finance (ibid). 
The task manager also stated that once the plan was approved, the Bedouins themselves 
would implement the plan and monitor the results: 
 
‘Community groups’ which build on traditional Bedouin lineage structures – the bayt – will 
prepare community action plans to tailor the objectives of the project to local circumstances and 
capabilities (ibid). 
 
According to the task manager, the most important point about this project was its 
thoroughly participatory and empowering community-based implementation 
arrangements (ibid). In addition to community empowerment and action, the task 
manager stated that mutual respect and trust had been established between the Bedouin 
community and the Egyptian government (ibid: 51). On reflection, he stated that: 
 
Through participation, we lost ‘control’ of the project and in so doing gained ownership and 
sustainability, precious things in our business. We also gained more influence with the local 
people, and they were more open to listening to our suggestions and to the experiences of other 
people in the world that we could provide (ibid).   
  
The Scientific Forestry Model 
In the early modern European state, its forests were primarily viewed through the fiscal 
lens of revenue needs; from ‘the crown’s’ point of view, interest lied in the annual 
revenue yield of timber extracted from the forests. In this ‘fiscal forest’ the actual trees 
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with all its vast number of possible uses, were replaced by an abstract tree representing 
a volume of lumber or firewood. The state’s narrow frame of interest excluded the vast 
majority of flora and most species of fauna, in addition to nearly everything touching on 
human interaction with the forest. Hunting and gathering, fishing, pasturage and so on, 
as well as the social significance of the forest as a place of worship and refuge among 
other things, was not present in the state’s ‘tunnel vision’ (Scott 1998: 13). The forest as 
a habitat for plants, animals, insects and humans, was replaced by the forest as ‘a 
manageable economic resource’. The management of such an abstracted ‘fiscal forest’ 
is referred to as ‘scientific forestry’, which was developed largely in Prussia and Saxony 
from about 1765 to 1800. Its emergence cannot be understood outside the centralized 
state-making initiatives of the period (ibid: 14). Mathematical principles, sample plots, 
size categories and colour coding would later contribute to and intensify the narrow 
vision of the forest primarily as commercial wood; the essential component of a logic 
that imposed neatly arranged constructs of science on a disorderly nature (ibid: 15). 
Another aspect of the fiscal forest was the convenience of uniformity; a uniform forest 
was a more manageable forest, a view that prompted centralized powers to turn to 
monocropping in order to increase revenue yields. In practice, the logic of scientific 
forestry would have disastrous effects as both natural and human factors intervened; 
monocropped forests deprived peasants of grazing, food, raw materials and medicines 
that earlier forest ecology had provided them. The uniform forest would also introduce a 
new term to the German vocabulary: ‘Waldsterben’, or ‘forest death’. The disruption of 
the highly complex process of soil building, nutrient uptake, and symbiotic relation 
between fungi, insects, mammals and flora, left uniform forests more vulnerable to 
natural injuries and stress such as storms, disease, drought, fragile soil, or severe cold 
(ibid: 20-21). Scott writes: 
 
…the simplified forest is a more vulnerable system, especially over the long haul, as its effects on 
soil, water and “pest’ populations become manifest…Given the fragility of the simplified 
production forest, the massive outside intervention that was required to establish it – we might 
call it the administrators’ forest – is increasingly necessary in order to sustain it as well (ibid: 22).    
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Scott uses the scientific forestry model as a metaphor to illustrate how powerful 
institutions like state bureaucracies and large commercial firms, are able through 
knowledge and manipulation to create manageable realities out of complex natural and 
social realities. Moreover, it illustrates clearly a common dimension of state-driven 
social engineering; the administrative ordering of nature and society (ibid: 4). I argue 
that the Egypt case illustrates a similar process. I will continue this argument in the 
following sections of this chapter. 
 
Participatory Rural Appraisal  
In Participation: the New Tyranny (2001), Francis discusses the participatory efforts of 
the World Bank, with a special emphasis on ‘Participatory Rural Appraisal’, the same 
methodological approach that was utilized in the Egypt case. Associated with one of the 
most influential writers on participatory methods, Robert Chambers, the PRA method 
has begun to feature commonly in World Bank projects. Moreover, it is seen as a means 
of ‘validating local knowledge and empowering local populations’ (ibid: 76). Chambers 
defines PRA as ‘a family of approaches and methods [that] enable people to share, 
enhance and analyze their knowledge of life and conditions, to plan and to act’ (ibid).  
The methodology of PRA consists of a wide number of research tools and 
methods, many of them that have been identified in the Egypt case. By using tools and 
methods such as semi-structured interviews, participatory, mapping, transect walks, 
seasonal calendars, social and historical profiling and matrix ranking, project designers 
hoped to formulate an extensive social overview that would generate vital insight into 
and understanding of Bedouin life and needs. However, the defining character of PRA, 
Francis writes, is primarily found in the ‘attitudes’ brought to the task. Core values of 
PRA methods are a heightened sense of self-critical awareness and personal 
responsibility, to rely on ones judgement before rules and manuals (ibid: 76). In the 
Egypt case, it was ‘intuition’ that told the task manager that a regular life-stock project 
would prove insufficient, which in turn directed him towards a participatory approached 
resource management project (1996: 48). As part of this heightened sense of awareness 
and responsibility is the acquisition of interpersonal and communicative skills. 
Participatory research practitioners are trained in learning before lecturing, but also to 
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be ‘respectful’ towards local skills and knowledge (2001: 76). This respectful approach 
towards local knowledge and practice is also evident in the interactions between 
Bedouins and government officials as described in the Egypt case. One example is the 
situation described as ‘silent observation’ in which non-Bedouin participants ‘watched 
respectfully as the Bedouins drew maps on the ground’ (1996: 133).  
 Francis argues that PRA does not have a formal theory of knowledge, but that it 
nevertheless has a distinctive attitude towards local knowledge. First, PRA focuses on 
the emic (actor’s) view, before the etic (observer’s) view, as local knowledge and 
constructs are valued over scientific taxonomies. Second, there is an emphasis on 
achieving credible information through local knowledge, by building trust and rapport 
with informants (2001: 77). Issues of ‘trust’ and ‘mutual understanding’ are mentioned 
on occasions in the Egypt case. On the matter of using semi-structured interviews, the 
task manager stated that it generated ‘a feeling for and understanding of the other’ 
(1996: 49). On reflection, the task manager also stated that participatory efforts had 
established ‘trust and respect…between the Bedouins and the government’ (ibid: 51). 
Third, there is an emphasis on differences rather than absolute measures, as 
‘comparison’ is higher valued than ‘measurement’. Researchers are expected to learn 
from exceptions rather than averages (ibid: 77). A fourth attitude towards local 
knowledge in PRA methods is a preference of visual over verbal data. An emphasis on 
visual data enables the participants to be independent of alphabetical literacy; visual 
data is therefore preferred by the argument that the ‘visual language’ of knowledge is a 
more universal one, and thus further empowers beneficiary groups and secures a 
levelled participation (ibid). This emphasis can be identified in the earlier mentioned 
situation when Bedouin participants drew maps on the ground. The importance of visual 
data is also present elsewhere in this case. For example, the spatial examination of 
transect walks consisted of walking along the periphery of the settlement whilst local 
people observed differences in land use, vegetation, cultural practices, etc. These 
observations were then recorded and later used in the production of transect diagrams 
(1996: 49).     
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Beneficiaries as ‘One Voice’ 
In cases were the World Bank includes beneficiary groups in participatory processes, 
participatory rural assessment is viewed as a methodology that ensures an extensive 
examination of local beneficiaries and local knowledge through the use of several 
participatory techniques. However, Francis argues that one of the most important 
limitations of most PRA efforts is their tendency to view communities primarily as 
collective entities: 
 
In Participatory Rural Appraisal, the ‘social’ is manifested in a heightened sense of ‘community’, 
a level privileged both methodologically and morally. Most PRA exercises are collective (2001: 
78).   
 
Francis continues that the emphasis on the ‘collective community’ has a few 
problematic consequences. First, insufficient attention is often paid towards levels of 
social differentiation within communities. Although techniques such as wealth ranking 
do try to identify differentiation and inequalities within the community, these efforts 
often fall short in practice as PRA efforts primarily seek to explain and identify 
‘community priorities’ and ‘community plans’ (ibid: 79). Although there is much 
emphasis on levelling differences between investigators (project designers, Bank staff, 
etc.) and communities, much less emphasis is directed towards differences within 
communities. Francis argues that such an emphasis may be equally critical, as 
‘transcending historically and culturally rooted differences and conflicts between 
genders, factions, castes and occupational groups’ are not easily done over short periods 
of time (2001: 79). A second consequence is the rather simplistic view of communities 
as singular agents, capable of planning and implementing collective initiatives. Francis 
argues that experience often does not corroborate this view, as collectivities above and 
below the community level often function as critical units for decision-making and 
action (ibid). Although such groups are not necessarily bluntly ignored or dismissed by 
PRA practitioners, there is still a frequent emphasis on the notional community, often at 
the expense of other social groups and institutions (ibid). As described in the Egypt 
case, the task force consisting of Bedouin, government and World Bank representatives, 
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set out to capture the diversity of the Bedouin community. However, the homogenous 
view of beneficiary groups is still evident when the task manager described the earlier 
mentioned ‘thoroughly participatory and empowering implementation arrangement’ that 
was to follow the research phase of the project: 
 
‘Community groups’ which build on traditional Bedouin lineage structures – the bayt – will 
prepare community action plans to tailor the objectives of the project to local circumstances and 
capabilities…Once the plan is prepared and approved, the community will be involved in 
implementing it and monitoring results (ibid: 50).      
 
The Sourcebook does not go into any detail concerning the organization of community 
groups built on the traditional lineage structure of the bayt. It does not even explain to 
the reader what a ‘bayt’ is. The ‘bayt’ in Bedouin community is the social entity that 
most closely resembles the notion of ‘domestic group’ or ‘domestic unit’ and translates 
as ‘tent’; in anthropological literature, the term is generally used to indicate an 
‘extended family’ consisting of several ‘conjugal families of male individuals of more 
than one generation united by descent’ (Fabietti 1990: 240-241). Now, what exactly the 
Sourcebook refers to when it says that the community groups builds on these bayts is 
uncertain. One possible interpretation is that a community group is organized as one 
bayt, with one male leader that makes all the decisions. This however, would surely go 
against the democratically characteristic of participatory initiatives. A more likely 
interpretation would be that the community groups comprise a number of household 
heads as equals in the decision-making process. Either way, what is most important 
about the building of community capacity in the Egypt case, is that it follows the 
traditional power structure of the Bedouin society. In the book Power: a Radical View 
(2005), Lukes refers to the words if E. E. Schattschneider: 
 
All forms of political organization have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of 
conflict and the suppression of other because organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues 
are organized into politics while others are organized out (ibid: 6). 
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Accordingly, I suggest that the efforts towards collecting diverse views and experiences 
in the research phase fall short when moving from the data-collecting phase to the 
action plan and implementation phase. If community action plans and their following 
implementation is formulated and organized through already existing power structures 
within the Bedouin community, the question is, to what degree are the diverse opinions 
and interests of the community included? The PRA method seemingly takes on the task 
of capturing diversity within communities. However, empowerment is not primarily 
attempted through the inclusion of different views and ideas within the community, but 
rather through the inclusion of those with power within the community. Hailey 
comments on the inadequacies of PRA method: 
 
…these processes are not as inclusive as might be expected, and they commonly rely on a small 
sample of self-selecting participants. The nature of group dynamics also suggests that power often 
lies in the hands of the most articulate or politically adept (2001: 94).   
 
He continues this argument by stating that such dynamics often serve to reinforce the 
status and power of existing individuals and groups within the community (ibid). In the 
Egypt case, I suggest that the World Bank views empowerment as a trickle-down effect; 
by empowering its leaders, the community as a whole is empowered. The community 
empowerment described in the Egypt case illustrates the World Bank’s view of 
beneficiary groups as collective entities. As described in the first chapter of this thesis, 
the third participatory concern states that beneficiary groups have to ‘build community 
capacity’, i.e. to strengthen their organizational and administrative capabilities in order 
to interact efficiently as one participant, or as one voice. The Sourcebook states that it is 
often through the organized beneficiary groups ‘that demand is expressed, participatory 
processes organized, and development services delivered’ (1996: 152). As earlier 
mentioned, Francis argues that ‘the notional community’ is frequently emphasized in 
World Bank participatory efforts, thus neglecting other social groups and institutions 
(2001: 79). The PRA method described in the Egypt case gives the impression of 
capturing the diversity of the Bedouin community, in an effort to empower the 
community as a whole. However, when organizing the community through already 
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existing power structures, one might question whether the diverse interests of the 
community are taken into account in later stages of the project.  
The PRA method as described in the Egypt case shares many of the features of 
the scientific forestry model presented at the beginning of this chapter. Whereas the 
European forest was seen as a manageable economic resource, the Bedouin community 
in the Matruh Resource Management Project is converted into a manageable social 
structure through the extensive mapping of the PRA method. Furthermore, the PRA 
method with its different participatory approaches is similar to that of the logistical 
representation of the forest; making the forest more manageable is achieved through 
various techniques such as mathematical calculations, sample plots, size categories and 
so on. The participatory techniques of the PRA method produces collective beneficiary 
renderings on different themes which then are interpreted and inserted into tables, 
calendars, etc. As the scientific forestry model imposed ‘neatly arranged constructs of 
science on a disorderly nature’ (1998: 15), the PRA method similarly imposes neatly 
arranged constructs of participatory techniques on the disorderly and complex social 
nature of the Bedouin community. The most important aspect of the narrowing vision of 
the scientific forest is what Scott calls ‘the convenience of uniformity’ (ibid: 20); a 
more uniform forest is a more manageable forest. I argue that the same logic may 
explain the World Bank’s emphasis on building community capacity when working 
directly with beneficiary groups. A uniform beneficiary group, removed from the 
complex social reality of individual interests within the community, is a more 
manageable beneficiary group. Accordingly, I view the process of ‘building community 
capacity’ as a process that ‘purifies’ the social reality of development activity. Instead 
of having to deal with a complex reality composed of individual thoughts and 
experiences, the World Bank narrows this reality through the capacity building of 
beneficiary communities. Beneficiary participation is possible when they act as one, 
organized and unified group. Only when equipped with the administrative, 
organizational and technical tools that enable an ‘efficient participation’ are 
beneficiaries ‘brought into vision’ in World Bank activities.  
Thus far, I have argued that the Nigeria case and the Egypt case exemplifies 
participatory processes that produce less than participatory results; in other words, the 
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management of content (whether it be spatial or social content) of development 
processes produces effects of control that constrains the definition of stakeholder 
participation. In the Sourcebook, by the words of the task managers, both of these case 
studies are portrayed as participatory and furthermore, as ‘successful’ participatory 
processes. Why is this? Furthermore, why even promote and utilize participatory 
approached development when participation is to a high degree limited by the 
operational logic of the World Bank? Why include other stakeholders, with other 
interests, understandings and needs, when the World Bank is so immersed in a certain 
way of thinking about and practicing development that effectively limit the participation 
of other stakeholders? I argue that the answers to these questions can be found by 
focusing on how participation is perceived in the Sourcebook, or in other words, how 
participation is translated into practice when introduced as development activities. The 
translation of participation will be discussed in the following section of this chapter.     
 
Translating Participation 
Before I start discussing translations specifically, I think it is important to understand 
the relationship, or more importantly, the conflict, between two opposing stances in 
World Bank development activities: the traditional ‘external expert stance’ and the 
‘collaborative stance’. The ‘external expert stance’ is described in the Sourcebook as the 
traditional approach to Bank-sponsored projects, which served as a precursor to the 
participatory stance that are more commonly applied today, not to all, but in many of 
the projects that the Bank is involved with. According to the Sourcebook however, the 
introduction of participatory approaches to World Bank practice has seemingly not 
significantly diminished the role of the ‘expert’:   
 
The external expert stance is not a World Bank innovation, but an inherent and deeply embedded 
part of our understanding of how to produce results and the role one plays in producing them 
(1996: 4). 
 
The main difference between the traditional external expert stance and participatory 
approaches, is that in the external expert stance, project sponsors and designers places 
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themselves ‘outside’ the system they are investigating, mainly viewing other 
stakeholders as sources for information. Subsequently, these ‘experts’ determine what a 
specific project would look like (ibid). With the introduction of the participatory stance, 
the Sourcebook reveals that this is now changing, and that efforts towards consultation 
and listening is being introduced to the role of the expert. A key characteristic of the 
participatory approach is that ‘the sponsors and designers take a stance that places them 
inside the social system being addressed’ (ibid: 3). The Sourcebook states that the 
external expert stance has previously often failed and that ‘development experience has 
shown us that when external experts alone acquire, analyze, and process information 
and then present this information in reports, social change usually does not take place’ 
(1996: 5). The emphasis on the word ‘alone’ in this quote supports the implication that 
the introduction of participation in World Bank activities does not necessarily imply a 
clean break with the traditional ‘external expert stance’. Simultaneously, the 
Sourcebook states that when analysis, objectives, strategies and project tactics are 
formulated collaboratively, programs are more likely to sustain over time, after their 
implementations. Accordingly, collaboratively approached development programs are 
also more likely to achieve real ‘social change’ (ibid: 3). If the introduction of 
participation in World Bank practice implies a sharing of influence and control, it would 
also imply a loss of influence and control, especially for the ‘expert’, and the knowledge 
that the ‘expert’ brings into development practice. How then are participation and the 
external expert stance, allowed to co-exist within World Bank development activities? 
If the collaborative stance were the antithesis of the external expert stance, would it not 
mutually exclude the other? When a ‘fact’ faces controversy in the shape of a new 
‘claim’, Latour describes the meeting as a ‘two-faced Janus’: 
 
They are as different as the two sides, one lively, the other severe, of a two-faced Janus. ‘Science 
in the making’ on the right side; ‘all made science’ or ‘ready made science’ on the other (2003: 
4). 
 
I suggest that the traditional or ‘ready made policy’ of approaching development in 
World Bank activities was the ‘external expert stance’. It gave the World Bank absolute 
control in terms project design and implementation, a control that ensured the 
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operational demands for efficiency and delivery. However, projects conducted by 
external experts often failed after implementation. ‘Participation’ as ‘policy in the 
making’ is viewed as countering this problem; the Sourcebook states that by allowing 
other stakeholders to ‘generate’ and ‘internalize’ social change, projects have a better 
chance of sustaining after implementation (1996: 5). On the other hand, the ‘soft’ and 
‘unpredictable’ characteristics of participation, threatens the operational demands for 
delivery. Both ‘stances’ offers positive aspects in terms of ‘efficiency’; the former in 
terms of project sustainability and the latter in terms of result-orientated delivery. I 
argue that ‘stakeholder participation’ as a practice enables the World Bank ‘to have the 
cake and eat it too’ by doing two things. As stakeholder participation is a collective 
process, the World Bank is dependant on the ‘enrolment of others’. However, once 
people have been enrolled, the World Bank must ‘control their behaviour’. To achieve 
this, stakeholder participation is subjected to a series of strategic translations.      
 
The Model of Translation: Enrolling others 
Whereas popular participation primarily is concerned with the participation of the ‘poor 
and disadvantaged’, the Sourcebook explains that other stakeholders affected by World 
Bank development initiatives deserve equal attention. Because of this, the Sourcebook 
shifted its attention from ‘popular participation’ to ‘stakeholder participation’. As 
mentioned earlier, the Sourcebook defines stakeholder participation as: 
 
Participation is a process, through which stakeholders influence and share control over 
development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affects them (1996: 3). 
 
By using examples from the Nigeria case and the Egypt case, I aim to illustrate how this 
primary understanding of stakeholder participation is translated in different ways when 
transformed into development practice. In this chapter, I will use the Latour’s model of 
translation to illustrate the strategies of interpretations applied when trying to enrol 
others; how to control those enrolled, will be addressed in the next chapter.  
Latour’s model consists of two main parts, whereas PART A describes the 
strategies of translating interests. The first translation Latour offers is (1) ‘I want what 
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you want’ (2003: 108). The first and easiest way to enrol others is to cater to their 
‘explicit interests’ (ibid). In the Nigeria case, one might say that stakeholder 
participation is presented as a methodological approach that caters to all the different 
interests simultaneously. First, it caters to the agricultural interests of the Nigerian 
government. As women farmers constitute 60-80 percent of the agricultural labour 
force, turning attention towards their needs specifically, would definitely benefit the 
national farm production in the country. Second, it caters to the interest of the women 
farmers themselves; as their voices and needs are heard, their working situation, and 
consequently their life situation, might improve. Third, it also benefits the World Bank 
as participatory approaches to development projects are seen as more sustainable. 
Hence, the changes that they help formulate and implement stand greater chance of 
sustaining over a longer period. As described in the Nigeria case, the Sourcebook views 
stakeholder participation as a sustainable approach to development that caters to the 
interests of relevant groups and benefits all those enrolled.  
The second strategy of translation is what Latour formulates as ‘if you just make 
a short detour…’ (ibid: 111). This strategy does not try to shift those enrolled away 
from their goals; it rather offers them to guide them through a ‘detour’ that allows them 
to reach these goals. This strategy is appealing to those enrolled if three conditions are 
fulfilled. First, the main road must be unavailable. Second, the detour must be well 
signposted, that is, it must be clear to those enrolled what the detour actually entitles. 
Third, the detour must appear short (ibid: 111-112). In the Nigeria case, the task 
manager and government officials emphasized the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders, 
and then especially local women farmers. The director of FACU stated that in order to 
better understand the constraints of these women at the local level, they had to broaden 
policy dialogue and bring a range of different stakeholders into the decision-making 
process (1996: 90). However, as an uncertainty about the women farmer’s ability to 
participate efficiently arose, the project management decided to bring in female 
extension agents to speak on behalf of women farmers during the decision-making 
proceedings. The task manager did not see the exclusion of direct beneficiaries as a 
decision that made the project less participatory. The decision to exclude women 
farmers and include female external agents was primarily seen as a strategy of ‘levelling 
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power’ within the decision process, which in turn would benefit all stakeholders, 
including the direct beneficiaries. However, the decision to remove these beneficiaries 
can also be interpreted as a detour; the main road, i.e. the inclusion of women farmers 
was closed because of the political and social constrictions that would have made it 
difficult for them to attend the workshop. Another, more important aspect that blocked 
the main road was the women farmers’ inability to ‘articulate their needs efficiently’. In 
the Nigeria case, the exclusion and inclusion of stakeholders as direct participants was 
done based on perceptions that measured their ability to participate efficiently in order 
to secure ‘good results’. I suggest that the exclusion of women farmers (who certainly 
were considered ‘relevant’) can be viewed as a detour that secured an overall project 
efficiency that would benefit everyone, including the excluded women farmers.      
A third strategy in enrolling others is the ‘reshuffling of interests and goals’. 
Latour argues that when trying to enrol others, their explicit interests present the biggest 
obstacle. In order to increase ones margin for manoeuvre, you may be dependant on 
doing away with these explicit interests (ibid: 114). One tactic in achieving this is to 
‘invent new goals’. In the Egypt case, the government had approached the World Bank 
and requested the formulation and implementation of a livestock project in the Matruh 
governate. However, during the identification mission, the task manager argued that a 
traditional livestock project would not be the appropriate solution to the rapid 
environmental degradation and poor resource management in the region (1996: 48). 
Whereas a traditional livestock project would introduce technical solutions and support 
services, in relation to animal health, the management of grazing land and water 
resources, the task manager was more interested in solving the underlying issues to the 
problems. According to the task manager, the problem was not primarily a technical 
one, but rather a ‘behavioural’ one: 
 
Local people would have to change the way they behaved, individually and collectively. 
Government would have to learn how to work with the local people and develop their trust and 
confidence. Finally, the Bank would have to learn how to contribute its knowledge and resources 
to fit what the local people were capable of and willing to do’ (ibid: 48).  
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The task manager thus invented a new goal. The problem that was to be solved was not 
the technical problems of the Matruh governate, but rather the attitudes and behaviour 
that caused the technical problems in the first place. Whereas a traditional livestock 
project could be formulated and implemented within the confines of the external expert 
stance, this new behavioural goal would be more adequately addressed by the ‘social 
learning’ generated and internalized by local people when using participatory 
approaches to development (ibid: 5). 
A second tactic in doing away with specific interests is to ‘invent new groups’. 
Latour writes that this can be difficult as ‘interests are the consequence of whatever 
groups have been previously engaged to do’ (2003: 115). In other words, the ability to 
invent goals is made difficult by the existence of already defined groups: 
 
It would be much better to define new groups that could the be endowed with new goals, goals 
which could, in turn, be reached only by helping the contenders to build their facts (ibid). 
 
As earlier argued, the Egypt case offers an example of how the social content of a 
Bedouin community was managed and made less complex. Whereas the utilization of 
the PRA method was described as a way of collecting diverse perceptions and needs 
within the community, the notion of ‘building community capacity’ had a fundamental 
ascendancy on how this information was used. The data collected from different groups 
and individuals within the Bedouin community, was used as input when creating a new 
operational structure organized through already existing relations of power; ‘community 
groups’ fashioned after bayts would formulate plans and monitor implementation. This 
example of community capacity building is related to the expressed difficulty of 
including beneficiaries in participatory approached development projects, as they often 
are not ‘fully mobilized’ and lack ‘the organizational…wherewithal to participate 
efficiently’ (1996: 132). Accordingly, the participation of direct beneficiaries in World 
Bank development initiatives is possible when they as one stakeholder, or one interest 
group, possess the institutional and organizational ability to participate efficiently. 
Instead of being a tool that collects ‘diversity’, the PRA method can be viewed as a 
technique that ‘manages’ the diverse and complex interests within a community. Once 
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the complexity of the Bedouin community was simplified through the PRA method, the 
collected data was used in the invention of a new group, i.e. the unified beneficiary 
group, sharing one voice as one participant.  
PART A of the model of translation illustrates the various strategies used when 
trying to enrol others; however, by applying Latour’s model to the development 
activities described in the Nigeria case and the Egypt case, I have also illustrated how 
translating participation in effect manages the content of participatory processes, both in 
terms of space and the social. In the next chapter, I will present a different case that 
illustrates a different way of managing participation. The Colombia: Electricity Sector 
Reform Project describes a participatory approached workshop, in which 
representatives from the Colombian government were brought together to define 
solutions to the problems of the electricity sector. Here, I will describe the ways in 
which behaviour and interaction between participants is limited as an effect of how the 
World Bank understands participation and the spaces within participation operates.  
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3   Managing Behaviour  
 
 
The desire to maintain monopolies over areas of knowledge encourages ritual practices designed 
to protect the sacred status of established approaches to understanding (Kothari 2001: 146) 
 
In the last two chapters, I have described how different participatory techniques 
combined with the operational rationality of the World Bank in effect manage, simplify 
and order development practices as social processes. I have also applied Latour’s model 
of translation to these processes as a way of explaining how the World Bank is able to 
manage contents through the many translations of participation.  
In this chapter, I will take a closer look at the participatory efforts of a World 
Bank initiated workshop. The Colombia: Electricity Sector Reform Project sought to 
solve the problems of a near bankrupt electricity sector of Colombia. The problems 
would be addressed by arranging a workshop in which participants from different 
positions in government could interact and define solutions collaborately. The 
Colombia case thus differs somewhat from the two prior case studies. Whereas the 
Nigeria case and the Egypt case (though in different ways) described the difficulties and 
means of including direct beneficiaries in participatory processes, the Colombia case 
offers an example in which direct beneficiaries are only briefly mentioned, and removed 
as direct participants from the very beginning. It is similar to the Nigeria case in terms 
of decision-making, which in both cases takes place in a workshop. However, in the 
Nigeria case I described the workshop as a space of relevant and efficient knowledge 
and focused explicitly on explaining why one set of stakeholders was excluded and 
others were included from this space. I will also approach the Colombia workshop as a 
space of knowledge, but with an approach that challenge the World Bank’s view of the 
workshop as a space in which participants exchange knowledge and generate solutions 
through equal interaction. Instead, I argue that the Colombia case offers an example of 
how the translations of participation enable a management of behaviour and interaction.  
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Colombia: Electricity Sector Reform Project  
Turid Sato, the task manager for the Colombia:  Electricity Sector Reform Project was 
given this specific assignment in 1984. The Colombian finance minister had declared 
the electricity sector bankrupt. As a response, the task manager organized a workshop 
consisting of fifteen Bank staff, familiar with Colombia, including the relevant division 
chiefs. This group eventually concluded that what Colombia needed was an institutional 
mechanism that could monitor the energy sector as a whole, and proposed the formation 
of a nationwide energy board. In addition, the Bank staff concluded that the electricity 
sector should stop new construction, including a $3 billion hydroelectric project called 
URRA, make better use of installed capacity, and finally, to increase tariffs (1996: 39). 
The solutions formulated seemed appropriate, but the manager issued one major 
concern: 
  
The trouble was: we weren’t the Colombians. The Civil service is competent and doesn’t 
welcome outside directives (ibid).  
 
At this stage, the preparatory work had been done in the traditional expert stance, by a 
group of external experts, with experience and knowledge about Colombia and the 
specific sector that had encountered a problem. However, although the solutions 
proposed seemed appropriate, the Task Manager was convinced that the solution had to 
come from ‘the Colombians’ themselves, and the main reason for this is stated above; 
according to the manager, the Colombian civil service was resistive towards outside 
directives. This concern can certainly be related to earlier mentions of the relationship 
between participation and sustainability; as solutions formulated and implemented 
primarily by external agents often fail, beneficiaries should be included in the decision-
making process to secure project sustainability.    
 The manager then proceeded to convince the Colombian government to work 
collaborately with the Bank in finding a solution together, and proposed a participatory 
approach called Appreciation-Influence-Control (AIC). According to the manager, this 
proposition went over well, stating that ‘the Colombians, including the minister of 
mines and energy…were delighted with my proposal of this approach’ (ibid: 40). At 
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this stage, the collaborative process had been initiated, with the inclusion of central 
government officials. This stage also introduced a ‘technology’ to the participatory 
approach, i.e. the AIC method.   
 The two parties agreed to schedule a three-day conference, but ‘the Colombians’ 
(as they are constantly referred to in the text) did not want the Bank as a participant, 
thinking that they were ‘seeking the chance to put a new loan in place’ (ibid). After 
some negotiating, they changed their mind, and allowed the presence of Bank 
representatives at the conference. Exactly what ‘some negotiating’ means is not 
specified in the text. Note that the reason given for the Bank’s seclusion was a 
resistance towards the possibility of additional loans. Until this point, resistance 
towards the Bank had presented itself twice. The Bank resident representative then 
proceeded to organize the conference in collaboration with Colombian representatives. 
One major assignment was the identification of ‘key stakeholders’, who the task 
manager described as following: 
 
…people with the power, influence and knowledge to change the electricity sector (ibid). 
 
These stakeholders would include the ministers, permanent secretaries, and other 
government officials, such as mayors and representatives of Congress. In addition came 
several expert consultants, members of the opposition party, six Bank representatives 
from project departments and two conference facilitators.  
To summarize, up until this point, the manager had in collaboration with other 
Bank employees, discussed the problem and found a solution, but was concerned that 
the solution had been worked out through the external expert stance. A solution had to 
be formulated by the Bank in collaboration with the beneficiaries to secure project 
sustainability. The manager then approached the relevant ministers of the Colombian 
government and suggested that the problems of the electricity sector should be solved in 
a participatory manner. The manager also suggested a specific participatory approach, 
the AIC method. The Bank’s resident representative was involved with the 
identification of relevant stakeholders. Bank expertise had therefore been applied to 
several stages in the process thus far; it had been applied in finding a solution, in 
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arguing for a participatory approach (by organizing a conference) and a specific 
participatory tool (the AIC method), and in identifying the relevant people that would 
attend the conference.   
 
Stakeholder Participation in Action 
The task manager had now managed to convince his Colombian counterparts that a 
participatory approach to decision-making would be the ideal way of solving 
Colombia’s electricity sector problems. They had arranged a conference that were to be 
held at the small northern town of Santa Marta; however, the manager soon 
encountered a major problem when one of the more influential representatives, chosen 
by the minister of planning, vetoed the participatory approach, arguing that ‘ministers 
want to make speeches, not participate in games’ (ibid). The argument went on for 
hours, and eventually, the AIC consultant and the other facilitator pulled out of the 
conference. The task manager had run out of options and announced that: 
 
If you insist on a traditional conference, I’ll announce tomorrow at the opening that we cannot 
guarantee any results with a traditional format, and therefore we will have to leave the 
management of the conference to you (ibid). 
 
With this ‘take it or leave it’ statement, their opposing counterpart changed her mind, 
but still insisted that ‘the ministers would never go along with the idea of working 
actively and equally with others in search for solutions’ (ibid). 
 Day one of the conference started with introductory remarks from four of the 
ministers present. Afterwards, the AIC consultant took the floor and introduced the 
method of approach that the representatives were about to participate in. The method 
would help the participants to understand and manage three levels of ‘environment’ that 
formed the fundamentals (Appreciation Influence Control) of the AIC method:  
 
 The internal or controlled environment (of the organization that have the power and 
responsibility to carry out projects in the electricity sector). 
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 The relationship with others outside the electricity sector who influence or are influenced by the 
achievement of the sectors purpose (beneficiaries, contractors, credit companies, advisers, and 
so on). 
 The relevant context that needs to be appreciated to understand the impact of economic, 
political, and cultural factors on the achievement of the electricity sector’s purpose.  
 
At this stage, the technology of participation was introduced to the representatives. By 
‘technology of participation’, I mean the technical aspect of the AIC method which is 
concerned with the fabrication of temporary subjectivities and/or identities of the 
participants. In other words, the technology was meant to provide participants with the 
tools to transform their positions and to put aside their everyday role as government 
representatives or ministers, i.e. their role as people with power, and embrace the role 
as ordinary citizens. After this introduction, the facilitator turned their attention towards 
what he called the ‘appreciative phase’; the participants were presented with the 
following hypothetical situation: 
  
Imagine that you are ordinary Colombian citizens. We have just received news that the power 
plants in the country had been blown up. You are all out of jobs. Over the next twenty-four hours, 
you will act as ordinary citizens and devise a new electricity sector, an ideal one that serves the 
interests of all Colombian people (ibid: 41).  
 
This approach was meant to stimulate as many ideas as possible, with an increased 
understanding of the economic, political and cultural context of the Colombian 
electricity sector. In addition, role-playing was also explained as a way of ‘levelling 
power’ in this specific context. By putting themselves into the mindset of ‘ordinary 
citizens’, and temporarily suspending their roles as powerful government officials, 
direct beneficiaries were seen as indirectly participating in this workshop. The 
participants were then divided into groups of ten, structured to balance the difference in 
power and experience between them. Furthermore, they were instructed to behave in a 
manner of ‘equality’: 
 
They were told to come up with ideas and listen to each other without comment or judgement. 
Questions would be allowed, but only to clarify, not to criticize (ibid). 
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These guidelines would, according to the facilitator, ensure the participants to free 
themselves of the present dilemma, and to maximize their ‘creative energies’, whilst 
role-playing as ordinary citizens would reduce the power differences among the group 
(ibid). The facilitator would also go between the different groups, to make sure that 
these ‘behavioural rules’ were upheld: 
 
The facilitator would go around ensuring that everyone was heard and that they listened 
uncritically (ibid). 
 
The manager viewed this approach as successful and stated that the participants 
enjoyed the new way of working together. The task manager also emphasized the 
creative and playful dynamic of the approach through statements like ‘the small groups 
were buzzing with ideas’ and ‘They really had fun’ (ibid). The most important benefit 
from this particular approach, according to the manager, was the levelling of power and 
position between the participants: 
 
The process enabled all the stakeholders, despite their relative power positions, to share 
information never previously brought together, to learn from each other and to build a common 
appreciation of the entire electricity sector and its relation to the broader energy sector and the 
national economy (ibid). 
 
The appreciative phase continued on day two of the conference. Using the same 
process as the day before, the same groups was asked to examine the present realities 
that the electricity sector was faced with, both positive and negative, which then was 
reported back to the other groups: 
 
With the help of the AIC consultant, the plenary was able to reduce all of the thinking into one 
overarching vision: a functioning system that provided electricity as a basic right of every 
Colombian citizen (ibid).  
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However, an interesting situation occurred during the proceedings of the appreciate 
phase. One of the participants, the manager of CORELCA, a corporation heavily 
involved in the earlier mentioned URRA project, expressed anger towards the 
insufficient attention directed towards the URRA project in the workshop. The task 
manager described the situation as following:  
 
He [the manager] stood up and said that he wanted to discuss URRA – now. He ignored the 
facilitators’ attempts to calm him, so the minister of mines and energy stepped in, saying “We 
will get to this issue in proper order. I ask you to wait.’ The CORELCA official wouldn’t take his 
seat. Finally, the minister took him aside and told him that, if he was not willing to participate in 
the process, he should leave. So the man did leave (ibid). 
 
The task manager stated that the remaining participants agreed with the minister, and 
that removing the manager was the right thing to do (ibid). After having dealt with this 
major disagreement during the appreciative phase, the facilitator moved on to the 
‘influence phase’; at this stage, the participants were provided with the tools to 
understand other external interest. Once again, the participants formed groups of ten 
with the same emphasis on equal interaction. They were presented with a map of 
relevant stakeholders, which enabled them to get a better overview of the competing 
interests relating to the sector. The different stakeholders were also placed by the 
participants within an AIC table, to illustrate whether the stakeholder had appreciative, 
influential or controlling power, and which consequently made it easier to work out 
strategies in relation to these stakeholders.  
 On the third day of the conference, the facilitator moved on to the ‘control 
phase’. In this phase, the participants who had the power to implement changes and 
solutions were asked to volunteer as ‘champions’ of different themes and organize the 
other participants in groups (ibid: 42). The groups were then asked to prepare action 
plans, and their conclusions were finally reported to the plenary. According to the task 
manager, their work was ‘accepted with little debate’ and after three days of working in 
a participatory way, ‘they had arrived at a consensus’ (ibid). As the conference came to 
its conclusion, the Task Manager described an energy of electric proportions:  
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The team spirit and commitment to action could be felt in the air. In one way or another, they 
said, ‘For the first time, we know what is happening. We came up with the answers, and we 
know what to do’. As people were making their own commitment about the future, their voices 
were filled with emotion (ibid: 43). 
 
Facilitating Stakeholder Participation 
According to Green (2003), the central figure in participatory approached workshops is 
the ‘facilitator’. Facilitators are generally self-employed consultants, hired specifically 
to organize workshops. They may also be asked to prepare key components for project 
documentation. These external consultants face certain expectations by their 
employers; the workshop has to produce the right relationship between input and 
output, between investments and results, a concern that clearly relates to Mosse’s 
notion of ‘dual logic’, and then specifically to the logic concerned with the operational 
demands of delivery. 
 According to Green, the facilitator often presents a ‘logical framework’ which 
consists of a chain of causality that can be reversed to design a project; for example, 
local poverty due to poor farmer prices, due to lack of access to markets, due to poor 
roads (ibid: 136). According to this chain of casualty, local poverty can be solved by 
strengthening infrastructure. This logical framework often determines the sequences of 
dialogue and group work that constitutes the participatory approach of workshopping. 
A common outline of the group work can be as following: 
 
Groups may be asked to produce lists of key problems using marker pens and flip charts, or state 
reasons why certain things occur. These are then reported back to the wider group and stuck on 
the wall for people to look at, literally enveloping participants inside the project text (ibid).  
     
Reporting provides the facilitator an opportunity to edit the recommendations and 
suggestions derived from the groups. The facilitator can do this by rhetorically 
questioning the points that would threaten the policy objectives of the project. He or she 
may also seek support from professional participants when rejecting a certain point or 
suggestion. Once suggestions have been edited, they are written up on new flip charts, 
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which eventually will form the basis of the project management documentation (ibid: 
114).    
Similar tasks were given to the groups in the Colombia Electricity example. In 
the appreciate phase, the participants were asked to engage in role-play, playing the role 
of ‘ordinary citizens’ to come up with an ideal future for Colombia. After ten minutes of 
individual reflection, the participants would contribute ideas within the group, which 
then was summarized for the plenary. In the influence phase, the groups discussed the 
themes and priorities for change and understanding the potential reaction in the political 
environment. Once again, the participants debated within their respective groups, then 
made a preliminary report to the rest of the groups. A list of main themes emerged, and 
the participants then proceeded to vote on four themes that should be prioritized. These 
included (a) a new direction for policy, (b) finance issues, (c) permanent improvement 
in management of the entire sector, and (d) a new climate of collaboration among the 
different stakeholders. According to the Sourcebook, the control phase was structured in 
a way that allowed the conference to produce clear outcomes and commitments (1996: 
42). This phase also used flip charts, each listing the main themes developed in earlier 
phases. Divided into groups, the participants were asked to prepare action plans, 
specifying concrete tasks that were to be solved, which then was to be reported to the 
plenary. Among the concrete recommendations were: 
 
 Institutional reform. A ‘rector’ or some kind of governing entity for managing the electricity 
sector in the context of the whole: investment policy, financial reform, technology, and so on.  
 New policy direction. A freeze on new construction for five years; diversification from 
hydroelectric to other power sources via conversion of existing power plants; and geographic 
diversification.   
 Financial issues. Change in the structure and levels of tariffs; external borrowing to buy time 
(ibid: 43). 
 
All the phases during the conference, as described above, were structured in a similar 
way. The participants were divided into smaller groups, and were asked to solve 
problems through different forms of interaction, which could be role-play, debating etc. 
After the groups had worked out solutions and suggestions, the work was then 
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presented to all the present participants at the conference, and often put down on to flip 
charts. The role of the facilitator in these plenary discussions was not mentioned 
specifically in the Sourcebook, except during the appreciate phase, where the AIC 
consultant helped the plenary ‘to reduce all of the thinking into one overarching vision’ 
(ibid: 41). However, when one looks at the consensus of solutions sited above and 
compares these to the solutions formulated by the Bank experts described at the 
beginning of the Colombia case, there seems to be little difference between them. The 
table below shows the solutions proposed at the World Bank workshop held in 
Washington by external agents opposing the proposed recommendations presented at 
the end of Colombia workshop: 
 
 
World Bank Workshop Colombia Workshop 
A nationwide energy board as an institutional 
mechanism to provide oversight to the entire 
sector 
A “rector’ or some kind of governing entity for 
managing the electricity sector in the context of 
the whole 
Stop new construction in the electricity sector, 
such as the planned $3 billion hydroelectric 
project called URRA 
A freeze on new construction for five years  
Make better use of installed capacity Diversification from hydroelectric to other 
power sources via conversion of existing power 
plants 
Increase tariffs Change in the structure and levels of tariffs; 
external borrowing to buy time 
Among the top prioritized solutions to the electricity sector problems were institutional 
reform and more specifically the establishing of a ‘governing entity’: 
 
A ‘rector’ or some kind of governing entity, for managing the electricity sector in the context of 
the whole: investment policy, financial reform, and so on (1996: 42). 
 
A ‘governing entity, for managing the electricity sector in the context of the whole’ is 
just a reformulation of an ‘institutional mechanism to provide oversight for the entire 
energy sector’. The latter formulation was, as mentioned before, the solution proposed 
at the World Bank workshop consisting exclusively of Bank staff. Moreover, the other 
recommendations that was worked out during the participatory approached conference 
included a ‘freeze on new construction’, a ‘diversification from hydroelectric to other 
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power-sources’ and ‘change in structure and levels of tariffs’. The Bank workshop 
concluded that the Colombians needed to ‘stop new construction’, specifically the 
planned hydroelectric project called URRA, to ‘make better use of installed capacity’, 
and ‘increase tariffs’. The results produced by the Bank workshop and by the 
participatory approached conference held in Colombia, appear to be close to identical. 
Note also that the Colombia workshop proposed external borrowing to buy time. As 
mentioned earlier, the Colombian government initially resisted the presence of World 
Bank representatives at the workshop, thinking that they just sought ‘the chance to put 
another loan in place’ (ibid: 40).  
Were the Colombian participants aware of this similarity between their solutions 
and the ones proposed by the Bank experts? This is not commented on in the 
Sourcebook. What is mentioned however is the way participants expressed their feelings 
about their involvement in a World Bank initiated workshop. Once consensus had been 
achieved, the minister of energy and mine took a microphone and walked around the 
room giving it to whoever wanted to speak, which according to the task manager, 
almost everyone did (ibid: 43): 
 
In one way or another, they said, ‘For the first time, we know what is happening. We came up 
with the answers, and we know what to do.’ As people were making their own commitments 
about their future, their voices were filled with emotion (ibid).  
 
As described by the task manager, the Colombian participants certainly felt that they 
had generated their own solutions to their own problems. What then could explain the 
consensus achieved by the Colombian participants at the workshop? How could a large 
group of stakeholders, mostly Colombians, divided by power and interests, collectively 
find the same solutions to a problem as fifteen external experts ‘familiar to Colombia’? 
I argue that the answers to these questions can be found by looking at the ways in which 
‘power’ operates through stakeholder participation as a social process. In the last 
chapter, I used Latour’s model of translation to illustrate how the different translations 
of participation simultaneously allows the World Bank to enrol others and to manage 
the contents of participatory development efforts. In the next part of this chapter, I will 
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use the model of translation to illustrate the different ways in which the World Bank is 
able to control the behaviour of those enrolled in participatory efforts.   
 
The Model of Translation: Controlling Behaviour  
In this section of the chapter, I will turn to the second part of Latour’s model of 
translation, titled ‘keeping the interested groups in line’ (2003: 121). Whereas PART A 
illustrates how to interest others, PART B offers strategies in how to make those 
enrolled and their behaviour predictable. The first strategy of controlling others is 
formulated as (1) ‘a chain is only as strong as its weakest link’ (ibid). Once the process 
of enrolling others have been achieved, the web of interests that tie these together may 
easily be undone. Latour writes: 
 
Something more is needed to turn the temporary juxtaposition of interests into a durable whole. 
Without this ‘little something’, the assembly of people…will behave unpredictably: they will 
dissent, they will open it, tinker with it; worse, they will lose interest and drop it altogether (ibid: 
122). 
 
The only way to stop this from happening is ‘to link the fate of the claim with so many 
assembled elements that it resists all trials to break it apart’ (ibid). In the Colombia case, 
this is done by linking stakeholder participation as a method of finding solutions 
directly to the problems of the electricity sector in Colombia. The importance of using 
this method (in the eyes of the World Bank) is evident on two different occasions of 
conflict as described in the Colombia case. First, it is evident in the situation in which 
an influential government representative vetoed the participatory approach, stating that 
ministers were not interested in what she regarded as ‘playing games’ (1996: 40). As 
the argument went on for hours, the AIC facilitator eventually threatened to pull out of 
the project stating that they could not ‘run this conference the way you want it’ (ibid). 
The task manager backed up the facilitator with the argument that the project 
management could not guarantee results with a traditional format. The ‘weak link’, i.e. 
the representative that vetoed the participatory approach, eventually backed down as the 
task manager argued that the conference would only happen along the lines of 
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stakeholder participation. The situation describing the conflict involving the disgruntled 
CORELCA manager, also illustrates how ‘weak links’ are dealt with. Angered by the 
fact that the proceedings of the conference had yet to address the URRA project (of 
which his company was heavily involved with), eventually led to him being asked to 
leave the conference. As the first situation offered an example in which a disruptive 
element were given an ultimatum of whether the conference would happen at all, the 
second situation offers an example of which the disruptive element was altogether 
removed from participatory process. Both situations offer examples of how opposing 
elements that threatened the framework of stakeholder participation were dealt with. 
The fate of the electricity sector is presented as intrinsically linked with stakeholder 
participation. If the conference was not approached in a participatory manner, the task 
manager could not guarantee any results (ibid). In the Colombia case, stakeholder 
participation was translated as the most efficient way of dealing with the problems of 
the electricity sector. In order to achieve a clear outcome, all participants had to comply 
with the principles of stakeholder participation.   
A second strategy of controlling others is to (2) ‘tie up with new unexpected 
allies’ (Latour 2003: 124). The first strategy of controlling those enrolled protects the 
ties between different interest groups through the disarmament, or altogether 
elimination of disruptive elements. The second strategy involves bringing in a new 
element in cases where old links are disrupted, a new element that is able to make use of 
dismantled elements and reattaching them to each other (ibid: 125). In the Colombia 
case, the different key stakeholders invited to participate at the conference can be 
viewed as what Latour calls ‘dismantled elements’. The fact that these different groups 
inhabit different interests is evident when looking at the different situations of 
opposition; in addition, differences in power and locality (whether it be central or local) 
means that the stakes are different from group to group. The most important ally for the 
World Bank in this specific example is the facilitator. The Sourcebook itself comments 
on the importance of a strong facilitator:  
 
A skilled facilitator is trained in navigating around tough spots, guiding the entire group through 
new experiences, and stimulating open discussions and negotiating. The facilitator is a critical 
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catalyst for setting the AIC conference in motion and for steering participants towards a 
conference closure that leads to action (1996: 185). 
 
The use of the words ‘navigating’ and ‘guiding’ in this statement is interesting. 
Arguably, in order to navigate or to guide, one has to know the destination. If the 
workshop is to function as a space where participants define solutions collaborately, 
why then the need for a facilitator to guide and navigate? What is the purpose of a guide 
if the destination is yet to be decided? As earlier mentioned, there was an uncanny 
similarity between the solutions proposed in the World Bank workshop and the 
solutions proposed at the end of the workshop. I argue that this was not a coincidence, 
but rather a consequence of similar kinds of operational pressures that created the 
effects of management and simplification described in the Nigeria case and the Egypt 
case. According to Green, an important aspect of development planning is the concern 
centred on the notion of ‘outputs’; development activities are meant to produce 
measurable outputs, or results, within a limited frame of time. Because of this, 
development activities are often more concerned with fulfilling its own standards; 
standards which are products of and limited by an institutional frame which usually in 
directly related to investments (2003: 107). In terms of the participatory workshop, 
Green writes:  
 
…workshops serve two purposes. In constituting projects as social institutions they make projects 
tangible, and by creating a category of stakeholders they create a social group with a stake in 
perpetuating project space from which more immediate benefits of development derive (ibid: 
110).  
 
Green argues that the facilitator is brought in with the expectation of producing the right 
relationship between investment and result. The dynamic of participation in a workshop 
or conference must therefore be ‘controlled’ (ibid: 113). In order to achieve this, one is 
dependant on a certain degree of control. The facilitator in the Colombian case and his 
role in the context of the workshop should not be underrated. With the introduction of 
AIC method, the interaction between the participants attending the workshop had 
already been narrowed and was now guided by these fundamentals; the purpose of the 
 75
conference was to find solutions through the understanding and managing of the three 
levels of environment. While the AIC method dictated a structure of content, in terms of 
what subjects participants should address and in what way, the dividing of participants 
into groups dictated a structure of interaction. The facilitator also observed the 
interaction, physically moving from table to table to make sure that his rules of conduct 
were being upheld. The role of the facilitator can thus be viewed as a ‘guide’ in the right 
sense of the word. By directing interaction and controlling the movement of participants 
from one place to another, the facilitator took the participants on a ‘journey’ with a set 
destination; a destination that I argue had already been formulated at the Bank staff 
workshop. Green suggests that ‘the social constraints on workshop formats and the rules 
of participatory engagement and facilitation’ reproduce manageable social realities, 
which conforms to the representations contained in project texts (ibid: 137). 
Accordingly, I argue that the ‘consensus’ reached by the participants at the end of the 
workshop, was to a higher degree the outcome of the structural limitations of the 
workshop, as opposed to the workshop as a participatory process. The workshops are 
structured in a way that takes the participants through different sequences of discussion 
and group work determined by a specific framework provided by the facilitator, which 
make her/him an important ally of the project management. In the Colombia case, the 
facilitator was able to make use of dismantled elements in terms of government 
representatives with different interests, and to reattach them to each other by placing 
them inside a ‘framed’ workshop composed by different components that in effect 
directed the participants towards a predictable outcome.  
 
From Latour to Foucault 
In this part of the study, I have identified two different strategies of translations that 
enabled the World Bank to control the behaviour and interaction of participants and 
thus influence the outcomes of the workshop. In chapter two, I utilized Latour’s model 
of translation to illustrate how translations affect, manages and simplifies the contents 
of development, either as contents of ‘space’ as described in the Nigeria case or ‘social’ 
content as described in the Egypt case. The model of translation has been a useful tool 
in showing how the World Bank is able to manage and simplify different aspects of the 
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complex realities of the three case studies I have described. I think the next and natural 
step would be to find out why participatory processes are arranged in certain ways. Why 
would the World Bank go to such lengths of introducing participation to its own 
activities, and even formulate a lengthy document specifically concerning participation, 
if their translations of participation in different degrees inhibit the collaborative efforts 
of different stakeholders. I argue that the answer to this question might be answered by 
focusing on the perspectives of power as offered by Foucault. How stakeholder 
participation is translated and effectively arranged to produce specific outcomes, clearly 
indicates that some form of power is exercised. The situations of conflict as described in 
the Colombia case can surely be interpreted as instances of domination. However, 
‘domination’ does not explain why the Colombian participants expressed emotionally 
that they had formulated their own solutions. In addition, I have also identified 
translations of stakeholder participation that catered to the ‘interests’ of stakeholders 
that further complicates the view of dominance.  
In the next chapter, I will turn to Foucault’s notion of governmentality as the 
conduct of conduct. By approaching stakeholder participation as an organized practice, 
or as a regime of practices, I aim to explain more adequately why the translations of 
stakeholder participation manage content and thus take on the appearance as a form of 
government. 
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4   Participation, Ideas & Power 
 
 
Alternative 1 Multilateral development policy is determined by institutions driven by the common 
good. New ideas are welcomed, and those which are well founded empirically and analytically are 
adopted as the basis for decision-making. 
 
Alternative 2 Development policy is determined by neoliberal forces, epitomized by the US 
treasury, which use multilateral institutions to further their own agenda. Ideas that run counter to 
this agenda are either suppressed or distorted. 
 
Bøås and McNeill argues that these two extreme and caricatured positions should be 
avoided when analyzing the relationship between power and ideas in multilateral 
development institutions such as the World Bank (2004: 206). The former is naïve and 
ignores the powerful interest at stake both internationally, and within and between 
multilateral institutions. The latter is simplistic, ignoring the power of ideas and 
institutionalization, and the complex nature of power relationships within multilateral 
institutions (ibid). Bøås and McNeill thus propose a third alternative, more complex and 
mixed in its approach to the relationship between power and ideas: 
 
Alternative 3 Policies are the outcome of interplay between institutions and ideas; and each of 
these is influenced both by material interests and norms (ibid: 220). 
    
In the past three chapters, I have described three different case studies that illustrate the 
different ways in which participation is applied to development processes. In the first 
chapter we saw how the operational insistency on government inclusion, consequently 
led to the exclusion of direct beneficiaries. In the following two chapters, I utilized 
Latour’s model to illustrate how the World Bank was able to enrol and to control 
participants by subjecting ‘stakeholder participation’ to a series of strategic 
translations. A common denominator that I have identified in all the case studies is how 
participation is understood and translated according to an operational logic that 
emphasizes ‘participatory efficiency’ and ‘project efficiency’. Moreover, I have 
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described how these instances of stakeholder participation in effect arrange the content 
of participatory processes. How stakeholder participation is understood and how it is 
translated affect who is included and who is excluded; they affect the social by 
constructing groups that are meant to act homogenously as ‘one voice’; they affect the 
ways in which participants are allowed to behave and interact. As a term that in its most 
fundamental understanding is characterized as collaborative and democratic, 
stakeholder participation is translated in various ways that allows it to control the 
content of development activities. I have thus described how participation in effect 
manage, simplify and control different aspects of development activities. In this chapter, 
I aim to describe different perspectives of power that can illustrate why such instances 
of control occur in participatory approached World Bank development practices. In 
other words, what can explain stakeholder participation as a form of government?   
   
Stakeholder Participation: a Dominant Ideology? 
In Power: A Radical View (2005), Lukes argues that power is not only exercised in 
situations of conflict, as power also can be exercised by A through ‘influencing, shaping 
or determining [B’s] very wants’ (ibid: 27). Thus, Lukes extends his analytical 
framework by looking at observable conflict, but also by taking into account instances 
of ‘latent’ conflict. In relation to this notion of latent conflict, Lukes’ ‘three-dimensional 
view’ is also interested in studying subjective and real interest that exists outside of the 
realms of policy preferences and ‘grievances’ (ibid: 29). Lukes defines the concept of 
power as ‘A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B 
interests’ (ibid: 37). In accordance with this concept, the three-dimensional view offers 
a sociological approach to the study of how political systems prevent demands from 
becoming political issues. The three-dimensional approach seeks to explain power by 
paying attention not only to decision-making, but also by looking at non-
decisionmaking and how latent conflicts are suppressed and ‘real interests’ excluded 
(ibid: 40). The third dimension of power as understood by Lukes is ‘securing the 
consent to domination of willing subjects’ (ibid: 109). The spatial and social 
arrangements described in the three case studies certainly illustrate how decision-
making processes are managed and arranged in ways that affect the outcomes of 
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participatory processes. Arguably, these rational arrangements of participatory content 
secure order in terms of which decisions that are made, and which are not. Thus, my 
analysis aligns itself with Lukes in terms of how power is exercised by looking at non-
decision-making. However, the three-dimensional view of power has its limitations.  
The first problematic feature of Lukes’ approach is its tendency to approach 
power in ideological terms. This Marxian approach to power suggests that dominant 
ideologies are able to create ‘false consciousnesses’ among its subjects (ibid: 145). 
Lukes argues that power as domination is ‘constraints upon interests’ and that 
‘compliance to domination can be secured by the shaping of believes and desires’ (ibid). 
However, in relation to the case studies I have described in this study, I do not relate the 
exercise of power to a specific ideology of the World Bank. When analyzing power, 
Wolf argues that it is important to draw a distinction between ‘ideas’ and ‘ideology’. He 
does so because ‘ideologies suggest unified schemes or configurations developed to 
underwrite or manifest power’ (1999: 4). Wolf sees the term ‘ideas’ as encompassing 
the entire range of mental constructs that is present in public presentations and that 
equating ideas with ideology blurs the way in which ideas are linked to power (ibid). 
The division between ideas and ideology in relation to power should also be applied to 
the notion of stakeholder participation as an exercise of power in World Bank practice. I 
suggest that it would be more fruitful to approach stakeholder participation primarily as 
an idea, or as a term consisting of several ideas. The three case studies I have presented 
in this study, illustrates three very different examples of participatory approaches. As 
the task managers are confronted with three different complex realities, participation is 
applied differently in the respective cases, which in turn create different forms of social 
arrangements; accordingly, power is exercised in different ways. 
To approach participation as consisting of multiple ideas is reasonable when 
looking at the way in which the definition of ‘stakeholder participation’ is limited when 
translated into practice. The external expert stance is claimed by the Sourcebook to be a 
process in which the World Bank takes a stance outside the social system they are 
investigating and of which they are making decisions (1996: 4). Stakeholder 
participation on the other hand, is viewed as a stance that places sponsors and designers 
inside the social or local system. The main difference between the external expert stance 
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and the collaborative stance is how Bank representatives position themselves; instead of 
‘dictating’ development and change, they become participants of development. This 
change of role comes out of the idea that development as social change is more likely to 
happen and sustain when development initiatives are done in collaboration with those 
who are or will be affected by it. In addition, stakeholder participation has a moral 
connotation. The shift from external expert stance towards more participatory methods 
has an undercurrent of sacrifice as the World Bank offers to share its power to make 
decisions with the beneficiaries of development. The fundamental understanding of 
stakeholder participation suggest that stakeholders influence and share control over the 
development initiatives, decisions and resources that affect them (ibid: 3). A further 
implication of this definition is that power is ‘levelled’ between the different 
stakeholders; they all have the same supposition to exercise power, i.e. to influence, 
manage, and decide the outcome of development initiatives. If ‘ideology’ is understood 
as ‘a system of social and moral ideas’ (Bloch 2003: 293) and the definition of 
stakeholder participation is understood as a part of an ideology, then the translations or 
ideas that I have presented should emphasize the elements that define stakeholder 
participation, rather than constraining them. To approach participation analytically as 
an ideology in World Bank practice would be insufficient, as stakeholder participation 
as ideology by definition, is concerned with the sharing of power between stakeholders. 
Instead, I have identified instances of arrangement and management by looking at the 
ways in which stakeholder participation as ideology has been interpreted and 
reformulated through a series of translations.     
Another important limitation of the three-dimensional view is its emphasis on 
power as ‘domination’. As earlier mentioned, Lukes radical approach sees the exercise 
of power as the ability to prevent people from having grievances and to accept the order 
of things. In other words, power as domination is the ability to make people do what 
they otherwise would not do; this ‘false consciousness’ makes them act and behave 
against their ‘real interests’ (2005: 145). To analyze power in such a way, i.e. as 
‘domination’ and the removal of ‘real interests’, one would have to identify the interests 
imputed to and unrecognized by these actors (ibid: 146). The fundamental principles of 
discourse theory would say that such an ‘external standpoint’ is impossible. As earlier 
 81
mentioned, Lukes argues that the exercise of power is ‘constraints upon interests’ and 
that dominant ideologies shape the beliefs and desires of its subjects. This perspective 
draws heavily on the Marxian notion that dominant ideologies are able to create ‘false 
consciousnesses’ by making people act and think in ways they would not otherwise do. 
The term ‘false consciousness’ implies that the exercise of power denies subjects their 
‘real consciousness’, or in other words, that there is some objective ‘Truth of self’ 
blurred or veiled by dominant instances of power. Foucault however, argues that one 
will never discover ‘the Truth’ as all humans at any time is bound by discourse; one can 
not take a position outside of discourse and outside of representation as ‘truths’ are 
created within discourses (Jørgensen & Phillips 2006: 23). Although dominant power 
certainly can shield its subjects from alternative consciousnesses, they are not depriving 
them of a ‘real’ or ‘true’ sense of consciousness, but from contesting sets of discourses. 
Furthermore, Lukes himself, addressed the simplified view of ‘power as domination’, 
stating that:    
 
It was a mistake to define power by ‘saying that A exercises power over B when A affects B in a 
manner contrary to B’s interests’. Power is a capacity not the exercise of that capacity…and you 
can be powerful by satisfying and advancing others’ interests: PRV’s topic, power as domination, 
is only one species of power (2005: 12). 
 
How stakeholder participation has been understood and rationalized have certainly had 
powerful effects on the development processes described in the case studies. However, I 
view the power operating in these case studies as a different species than the three-
dimensional view advocated by Lukes. Where Lukes views the exercise of power as 
‘domination’, and as something that creates ‘false consciousnesses’ and makes people 
do what they otherwise would not, Foucault approaches power as something that works 
through the ‘interests’ of people. Power is approached as a ‘productive force’, rather 
than a dominant force. I argue that participation creates effects of power that operates 
between the principles of participation and the principles of domination. By utilizing 
Latour’s model of translation, I have illustrated how different ideas about participation 
allow the World Bank to enrol participants by catering to their interests and 
simultaneously to control their behaviour and thus influence the outcomes of 
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participatory efforts. Thus, I argue that the power exercised in the case studies is not 
one of domination, but one that to a certain extent operates through the interests of its 
participants. 
 
Governmentality as the ‘Conduct of Conduct’ 
 
Foucault redefined ‘government’…as the ‘conduct of conduct’, i.e. as any more or less calculated 
means of the direction of how we behave and act (Dean 1999: 2).   
 
For Foucault, government means the ‘the conduct of [other’s] conduct’ (1994: xxix). In 
Governmentality: Power & Rule in Modern Society, Dean comments on this definition 
by looking at the various implications of the word ‘conduct’ (1999: 10). First, ‘to 
conduct’ means to guide or to direct and implies some sort of calculation of how this is 
to be done (ibid). The term also has an ethical or moral sense, especially apparent when 
considering the reflexive verb ‘to conduct oneself’, meaning our self-directing concern 
and attention towards appropriate conduct when faced with different situations, for 
example at home or at work, or in relation to clients or friends (ibid). Another sense of 
the term ‘conduct’ is conduct as a noun, meaning our behaviours, our actions and our 
comportments, i.e. the articulated set of our behaviours (ibid). When putting these 
different senses of ‘conduct’ together, government as ‘the conduct of conduct’ entails a 
deliberate shaping of conduct according to particular norms and for a variety of ends. In 
addition, government is ‘an undertaking in the plural’ (ibid). According these different 
senses, Dean offers a more wide definition of governmentality: 
 
Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of 
authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to 
shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests, and beliefs, for definite but 
shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects, and 
outcomes (ibid: 11). 
 
This wider definition of ‘governmentality’ has further implications. First, government 
implies the attempt of deliberately directing human conduct, from the perspective (of 
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those seeking to govern), that human conduct is something that can be controlled, 
shaped and turned to specific ends (ibid: 11). A second implication is the concern of 
bringing ‘rationality’ into the calculation about how to govern. Rationality is defined as 
‘any form of thinking which strives to be relatively clear, systematic and explicit about 
aspects of external or internal existence, about things are or how they ought to be’ 
(ibid). This rational attempt to shape conduct is also linked with a sense of morality; if 
morality is understood as regulating action or conduct according to a set of norms, then 
government is ‘an intensely moral activity’ (ibid). As notions of morality and ethics 
generally rest on an idea of self-government, ‘governmentality’ as ‘the conduct of 
conduct’ is not only concerned with how people exercise authority over others or how 
we govern abstract entities such as ‘the state’ or ‘populations’; it is also concerned with 
‘how we govern ourselves’ (ibid: 12).  
In the attempt to study how the rationality of government works, Dean 
formulates what he calls an ‘analytics of government’. An ‘analytics’ is a study 
concerned with the analysis of the conditions under which particular entities emerge, 
exist and change (ibid: 20). The study of ‘the art of government’ (Foucault 1994: 207) is 
not concerned with the actual relations between authority and domination; rather, it is 
concerned with the study of the organized practices through which we are governed and 
through which we govern ourselves; these ‘organized practices’ is what Dean calls 
‘regimes of practices’: 
 
These regimes…involve practices for the production of truth and knowledge [and] comprise 
multiple forms of practical, technical and calculative rationality (1999: 18).  
 
Furthermore, ‘regimes of practices’ are fairly coherent sets of ways of going about 
things; they are institutional practices of more or less organized ways of thinking about 
and practicing things as caring, administering, counselling, curing, punishing and in the 
case of this thesis, participating (ibid: 21). 
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Stakeholder Participation as a ‘Regime of Practices’ 
An analytics of government examines ‘the conditions under which regimes of practices 
comes into being, are maintained and are transformed’ (ibid). A simplified framework 
for the analytics of government takes as its concern ‘how we govern and are governed 
within different regimes, and the conditions under which such regimes emerge, continue 
to operate, and are transformed. It thus emphasizes ‘how’ questions like ‘how do we 
govern’ and ‘how are we governed’. However, such an analysis is not only concerned 
with the empirical routines of government; it also attempt to understand how these 
routines are thought or rationalized (ibid: 29). To examine stakeholder participation as a 
regime of practices, is to examine how participation as a practice operates, and more 
importantly how it governs conduct. 
Dean argues that there are certain dimensions of government, which allow us to 
discover how government functions in terms of its regimes of practices. The first 
dimension is the ‘fields of visibility of government’ (ibid: 30). Dean writes that the 
fields of visibility that characterizes a regime of government might be discovered by 
looking at how certain objects are illuminated and defined, and how others are obscured 
and hidden (ibid). Studies of governmentality thus emphasize the visual and spatial 
dimensions of government (ibid). The term ‘visibility’ is explicitly addressed when the 
Sourcebook describes the need to ‘build community capacity’ when including direct 
beneficiaries in development projects. As earlier mentioned, the Sourcebook states that 
it is important to identify informal and often ‘invisible’ groups in beneficiary 
communities, since it often through such organizations that ‘demands are expressed, 
participatory processes organized and development services are delivered’ (1996: 152). 
The expressed need to identify invisible community organizations, i.e. groups that are 
unlisted or not documented, imply a view of beneficiary communities as disorderly, a 
view fortified by the fact that such groups must be strengthened administratively and 
organizationally once they have been identified. The Egypt case described a project that 
sought to capture the diverse interests and perceptions of members of a Bedouin 
community. Although the process of collecting diversity was seen as participatory, the 
community first became an active participant when they were strengthened 
administratively and organizationally through the formation of so called ‘community 
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groups’. It was through these community groups, structured through traditional power 
relations, that the Bedouin community ‘came into vision’ as a participant that would 
tailor objectives and help implement and monitor these objectives (ibid: 50). 
A second instance of visibility is certainly identifiable in terms of government 
participation; in World Bank development projects, government or representatives of 
government are always present, which stems from the expressed need of ‘getting 
government support’. Thus, the government is always visible in the landscape of 
stakeholder participation. The Sourcebook states that ‘without government support, the 
Bank can do little to initiate, broaden and sustain participation (ibid: 122). The Nigeria 
case described how the presence of government officials as participants, consequently 
led to the exclusion of women farmers as direct participants in the National Planning 
Workshop. This case does not only reflect visibility in terms of government as 
participants, but also the spatial visibility of the workshop as a space of relevant and 
efficient knowledge. The visibility of government is also illustrious in the Colombia 
case, where most of the participants were brought in from different positions in 
government. The rationalization of including government officials and state employees 
before direct beneficiaries was related to the technical orientation of the problem and 
the fact that the key stakeholders were ‘the people with the power, influence and 
knowledge to change the electricity sector’ (ibid: 40).  
What all the three case studies have in common is the implied bipolarity of 
‘visible’ governments and ‘invisible’ beneficiaries. Moreover, visibility and lack thereof 
are also linked with the notions of ‘efficiency’ and ‘sustainability’, terms that I view as 
inherent elements of the operational logic the World Bank. I argue that visibility is very 
much interrelated with a ‘technical aspect’, a relation that can be identified on two 
accounts; first, visibility in terms of participation is largely concerned with efficiency 
and technical knowledge; second, participatory techniques can be utilized to increase 
the visibility of direct beneficiaries.  
The second dimension in the analytics of government is called ‘the technical 
aspect of government’ (1999: 31). If government is to achieve its ends, then it must use 
technical means, means that are a condition of governing and often impose limits on its 
capabilities (ibid). I have already discussed the relation between the notions of 
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‘participatory efficiency’ and ‘technical knowledge’. For example in the Nigeria case, 
the technical knowledge of government representatives made them attractive 
participants. However, their inclusion was also related to the participatory technique 
involving the use of ‘surrogates’. Surrogates (in the shape of female extension agents) 
were brought into the workshop under the assumption that the women farmers did not 
possess the ‘ability to articulate their problems and needs effectively in this sort of 
context’ (1996: 90). By ‘this sort of context’, the task manager were referring to the 
participation of government officials in the National Planning Workshop. The technique 
of using surrogates can thus be related to the characteristic visibility of government in 
World Bank development projects. Since the participation of government 
representatives and the knowledge they possess were seen as a necessary requirement, 
the women farmers were excluded from the decision-making process and replaced by 
surrogates that were seen as possessing the supposition to participate efficiently with 
government representatives.       
  The use of surrogates is explained as one of many levelling techniques utilized 
in World Bank participatory development projects. Levelling techniques are utilized to 
counter the limited opportunities of beneficiaries when confronted with other and more 
powerful stakeholders. The building of community capacity described in the Egypt case 
is also seen as a levelling technique; whereas levelling power in the Nigeria case 
involved using surrogates as replacements for women farmers, the levelling of power in 
the Egypt case incorporated the idea of strengthening the ‘weak structures’ commonly 
applied to poor communities (ibid: 132). Like in the Nigeria case, ‘building community 
capacity’ as a technique reflected the fields of visibility of World Bank activities. The 
expressed difficulty towards including direct beneficiaries, whom usually are members 
of poor communities, implies a disorderly characterization of beneficiary communities. 
They are less visible because of their complexity and their distance from the 
bureaucratic, administrative and organizational reality of the World Bank. By 
strengthening their operational capabilities in terms of increased administration and 
organization, they become visible and can act as a stakeholder.  
The mobilization and administration of beneficiaries also reflects visibility in 
terms of identities. The Sourcebook does not see stakeholder participation as a social 
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process of individual interaction, but rather as a process of group interaction. The 
emphasis on groups is especially apparent when it comes to including direct 
beneficiaries as participants. The act of mobilizing beneficiaries through community 
capacity building is to transform the complex inner workings of a community consisting 
of individuals, into one cohesive group, speaking with one voice. The Bedouins in the 
Egypt case was given a ‘collective identity’, as individual identities were obscured in 
the mobilization of the community as a whole. The women farmers in the Nigeria case 
were removed from the decision-making process as a collective group, as the task 
manager disregarded the fact that they as individuals composing a group, would inhabit 
different capabilities in terms of ‘articulation’ and ability to handle ‘intimidating’ and 
‘overwhelming’ situations.       
‘Workshopping’ as described in the Nigeria case and the Colombia case can also 
be approached as a participatory technique in which participants are given a forum 
where they can interact on equal terms and define solutions collaborately. Moreover, the 
workshop as a participatory technique also has a spatial dimension. The workshop is 
seen as a space that can be ‘filled’ with both local knowledge and technical expertise; 
participants can thus utilize this knowledge to produce new knowledge in the shape of 
solutions and clear outcomes that are both locally tailored, financially viable and 
technically sound (ibid: 91). The Colombia case workshop consisted mainly of 
representatives from different positions in government. Even though direct beneficiaries 
were not included, there were still differences in power between the participants. The 
participants were subjected to a number of ‘behavioural rules’ meant to ensure that 
interaction happened on equal terms. For example, the participants were instructed to 
listen to each other without comment or judgement and questions asked should only 
clarify, not criticize (ibid: 41). A central figure in the Colombian workshop was the 
‘facilitator’, whose presence can be viewed as a technique in itself. Hired specifically to 
guide participants through the workshop, the facilitator not only provided participants 
with ‘rules of behaviour’, but also played an active role in policing them, walking from 
table to table to make sure that everyone was heard (ibid). 
The third dimension in the analytics governments is ‘government as rational and 
thoughtful activity’. This will be addressed in the following section of this chapter. 
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Operational Rationality, Efficiency and the ‘Disposing of Things’ 
The third dimension in the analytics of government is concerned with the forms of 
knowledge that arise from and inform the activity of governing (1999: 31). Dean calls 
this the episteme (meaning knowledge) of government, which is concerned with what 
forms of thought, knowledge, expertise, strategies, means of calculation, or rationality 
are employed in practices of governing (ibid). What knowledge or rationality then 
informs participation as an organized practice, or as a regime of practices? What could 
explain the purpose of participatory approaches in these World Bank development 
activities? On an ideological level, I suggest that stakeholder participation, as 
development strategy is a response to the critique that has been directed towards the 
‘dictatorial’ characteristics of traditional approaches to development in World Bank 
activities. In this sense, participation can be viewed as a political strategy attempting to 
increase positive publicity. This view is reasonable when looking at the positive 
connotations that usually follow participation as a term; words such as ‘collaboration’, 
‘democracy’, ‘equality’ and ‘empowerment’ certainly sit better in the contemporary 
socio-political landscape of the western world, as opposed to expressions such as 
‘expert’, ‘top-down’ and ‘control’. In the sense of ‘development as vision’, participation 
also has an explicitly utopian aspect as it is concerned with ‘making things better’, but 
not only in a material sense. Participation is also seen as having psychological effects in 
terms ‘attitudes’ and ‘feelings’. This is evident in the following statements taken from 
the three case studies:  
 
‘In addition to community empowerment and action, trust and respect have been established 
between the Bedouins and the government’ (1996: 51); ‘It created a much greater awareness 
among policymakers’ (ibid: 94); ‘They also gave both sides a feeling for and understanding of the 
other’ (ibid: 49); ‘As people were making their own commitments about their future, their voices 
filled with emotion’ (ibid: 43); ‘It helped men recognize that women were experts too and had 
valuable knowledge to contribute’ (ibid: 91); ‘We have seen…team spirit emerge, often expressed 
as a feeling of elation and harmony among the participants, generating the energy to move 
forward’ (ibid: 44).  
 
 89
These statements imply a view of participatory approaches to development as a sort of 
‘collective psychological healing’ that transcends and levels differences in terms of 
gender and power. Dean argues that government is a fundamentally utopian activity that 
is based on certain values. Dean underlines however, that is important not to view 
regimes of practices as expressions of values; instead one should question what 
functions these ‘values’ have within rationalities of governments (1999: 34).  
I argue that the functionality of stakeholder participation as a ‘value’ or as ‘the 
improvement of mentalities’ is evident when the Sourcebook discuss the conjunction 
between the participatory approach and project sustainability. Participatory approaches 
to development are seen as more likely to achieve stability and sustainability for 
development projects after implementation, as opposed to projects designed and 
implemented by external experts. The explanation for this, is applied to the ‘social 
learning’ that happens during participatory approaches. The Sourcebook states that the 
social learning that stakeholders generate and internalize during participatory planning 
and/or implementation does enable social change. The knowledge of how to increase 
the sustainability of World Bank projects, in addition to participation as a strategic 
political tool, can both serve to explain why stakeholder participation is both advocated 
and practiced in World Bank development activities. However, I argue that neither 
informs stakeholder participation as an organized practice, or as a ‘regime of practices’. 
The World Bank is after all a bank, an institution that invests money and resources 
towards projects that should produce results accordingly. Sindzingre corroborates this 
view (2005):  
 
The Bank is, first and foremost, a bank and not a research institution. It continues to be dominated 
by economists and financiers (and also engineers) (ibid: 166). 
 
I argue that the knowledge that informs the participatory efforts of the World Bank are 
the rational or logic concerned with the right relationship between input and output, 
between investment and result. Stakeholder participation as different versions of 
organized practices is primarily informed by an operational rationality that emphasizes 
delivery through technical means. McNeill states:              
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It is accurate to state that the World Bank is dominated by an economic perspective, and a 
technocratic perspective. There are perhaps some signs of change with regards to the first; the 
economic perspective is perhaps being modified to a limited degree. But the second can, perhaps, 
never be changed. The very nature of the World Bank – and other multilateral assistance agencies 
– is technocratic (McNeill 2004: 121).          
 
I certainly support McNeill’s assessment of the World Bank as fundamentally 
‘technocratic’. Moreover, I argue that the emphasis on technical knowledge and 
solutions affect and limit the participatory efforts described in the three case studies, 
and most commonly in ways that benefit the operational standards of the World Bank. 
The first and most evident indication of this is the earlier mentioned inclusion of 
government as participants. First, including government as participants is seen as vital 
because government is ‘the one who repays the Bank loan or credit’ (1996: 125). Thus, 
stakeholder participation as a development practice certainly incorporates an economic 
perspective. Moreover, this economic consideration of government inclusion also has a 
technical aspect. I have earlier related the visibility of representatives from government 
to their ability to bring technical and economical perspectives into the participatory 
process. The Sourcebook states that the experiences described in Sharing Experiences 
indicate the growing support by task managers of stakeholder participation, i.e. as 
processes in which: 
 
…stakeholders contribute their experience and expertise – for instance, the experience of what it 
is to be poor or the expertise to develop specifications for a new road or educational program 
(ibid: 5).    
 
This statement implies a division in the sorts of knowledge brought into participatory 
processes. Direct beneficiaries, i.e. the poor contribute ‘experiences’, whilst 
government representatives and ‘experts’ contribute ‘technically orientated expertise’. 
The Nigeria case in particular, but also the Egypt case, described how direct 
beneficiaries were measured in terms of ability to participate efficiently, and the 
‘standard’ of efficiency was directly related to the inclusion of government and other 
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experts. This standard of efficiency has three further implications. First, it is certainly 
an implication of what types or forms of knowledge that the World Bank deem most 
important. Second, since the technical knowledge and efficiency of government 
representatives are seen as important arguments in favour of their participation, 
technical means must be utilized to ‘level’ the field; in other words, measures must be 
taken to ensure that direct beneficiaries can participate on the same level of efficiency 
as their more ‘powerful’ counterparts. The third implication is a consequence of this 
operational emphasis on efficiency. Whereas the technical knowledge of government 
furthers the operational demands of the World Bank by its characteristic ‘efficiency’, 
participatory efficiency in terms of direct beneficiaries relies on the ‘management of 
complexity’. In other words, it relies on the ordering and simplification of the 
complexity of beneficiary groups in order to counter their invisibility.      
It is primarily at this stage that the ‘governmentality’ of stakeholder participation 
becomes evident and identifiable, inasmuch as the case studies all describe stakeholder 
participation as organized practices that in different ways ‘arrange’ and ‘dispose things’. 
Foucault views government as a practice enabled by a specific rationality concerned 
with the proper way of managing populations, and to arrange things in such a way that 
it leads to a ‘convenient end’ for the population as a whole. Thus, government as ‘the 
conduct of conduct’ works through the interests of the population and for the common 
good of those governed. Stakeholder participation illustrates a similar process of 
arrangement, not through laws, but through a number of strategies that arranges 
stakeholders in a specific way that allows the achievement of specific ends. An 
important arranging factor is the already mentioned inclusion of government as 
illustrated most clearly in the Nigeria case. However, I have also identified a number of 
strategic ‘translations’ of stakeholder participation that in effect arrange the content of 
participatory processes. According to the model of Latour, I divided these translations 
into two different stalls with specific purposes. The first set of translations is concerned 
with the enrolment of others. In terms of stakeholder participation, these strategic 
translations aim to push for participatory approaches to development, by catering to the 
specific interests of stakeholders. In other words, stakeholder participation is argued as 
the optimal way of finding solutions to the problems that each case study describes. 
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However, even though these translations emphasized the positive qualities of 
stakeholder participation as a way of finding solutions that benefits everyone, they also 
had a number of arranging effects. I illustrated how one strategy offered a detour that 
excluded women farmers on behalf of overall project efficiency. Another strategy was 
to invent a new group through the extensive mapping and later capacity building of a 
Bedouin community. These enrolling translations certainly illustrate ‘governmentality’ 
on two accounts. First, they are informed by a rationality that views stakeholder 
participation as a practice that benefits all stakeholders; in other words, it is in 
everyone’s interest to agree to and participate in such an activity. Second, the 
translations arrange stakeholder participation in a way that limits and controls conduct; 
how stakeholder participation translates decides the ways in which stakeholders are 
allowed to participate. This was especially illustrative in terms of the participation of 
direct beneficiaries as described in the Nigeria case and the Egypt case.        
The second set of translations is concerned with the strategic approaches that 
enable the ‘control’ of those enrolled. I identified two such instances of translations in 
the Colombia case. The first strategy involved the removal of weak links that threatened 
the participatory process; I applied this strategy to two instances of conflict, and more 
importantly how these conflicts were resolved. The other strategy involved tying up 
with new and unexpected allies. In the Colombia case, the most important ally of the 
task manager was the ‘facilitator’; brought in as an external consultant, the task 
manager is viewed by the World Bank as a ‘guide’ that navigates participants towards 
clear outcomes. In the third chapter I discussed the further implications of the facilitator 
as a guide; by ‘framing’ the workshop in a way that shaped and limited interaction 
among participants, the Colombia workshop consequently produced solutions identical 
to those proposed by Bank experts.  
The three case studies that I have described in this thesis all contain instances of 
‘governmentality’ as in how stakeholders are governed within stakeholder participation 
as an organized practice. However, The Colombia case also offers an example of how 
stakeholders govern themselves. Note that I here speak of ‘self government’ in a 
narrower sense than that encompassed by the phrase ‘conduct of conduct’. I first and 
foremost discuss ‘conduct of the self’ as evident in a participatory project, i.e. as part of 
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a regime of practices and thus largely ignore the notions of ‘conduct of the self’ that 
operate relatively outside and independently of government practices. An instance of 
the ‘conduct of the self’ in the Colombia case is evident when looking at how the task 
manager described the situation in which participants reflected over their own 
achievements: 
 
In one way or another, they said, ‘For the first time, we know what is happening. We came up 
with the answers, and we know what to do.’ As people were making their own commitments 
about their future, their voices were filled with emotion (ibid).  
 
The participants certainly felt that they had generated their own solutions to the 
problems of the electricity sector; however, these solutions had already been formulated 
at the World Bank workshop. In The Guru and the Conjurer (1989), Barth describes the 
transaction of knowledge in New Guinea between the initiator and his novices. The 
initiator possesses the sacred knowledge of his culture and commands this body of 
knowledge in the context of the ritual, by manipulating concrete symbols and placing 
items within the different stages of the initiation. The purpose of the ritual is to reveal 
secrets by manipulating these concrete symbols; however, it is the performance itself 
and not its content that enables the transformative effects of the novices (1989: 643). I 
argue that the Colombia workshop illustrates a similar process; the facilitator takes on 
the role as a sort of ‘technocratic initiator’ that manipulates interaction and takes the 
participants through the various stages of the workshop. As earlier mentioned, the 
Sourcebook claims that ‘social change’ is more likely to happen when stakeholders are 
given the opportunity to ‘generate’ and ‘internalize’ these changes themselves (1996: 
5). However, the Colombia case illustrates a very limited way of ‘generating’ decisions. 
The workshop as a space of knowledge was limited by its framework, as defined and 
monitored by the facilitator, and thus created a predictable outcome that explicitly 
aligned with the technical standards of the World Bank. I argue that the most important 
characteristic of the Colombia workshop was not the notion that participants generated 
solutions themselves. Much like the novices of the initiator in New Guinea, the 
Colombian participants were drawn into a ‘performance’ of participation with 
chronologically structured ‘acts’ that lead towards a ‘grand finale’. The participants 
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were not spectators, but part of the performance. It is not the content of the performance 
that was important (considering the fact that the World Bank already had defined 
solutions to the problems of the electricity sector), but rather the performance itself that 
had transformative effects on the participants. The Colombia workshop was not a space 
in which knowledge was generated, but rather a space in which a specific type of 
knowledge was ‘internalized’ by participants. I suggest that the framework of the 
Colombia workshop on the one hand, directed the participants to ‘generate’ specific 
solutions that benefited the operational demands of the World Bank, whilst 
simultaneously allowing them ‘to learn’ by internalizing what was produced.                    
 
The Entry Point of Power  
As mentioned earlier, ‘governmentality’ implies the notion that human conduct is 
something that can be controlled, shaped and turned to specific ends (Dean 1999: 11). 
In the Sourcebook, the control of human conduct isn’t just identifiable in terms of the 
control of behaviour, but also in terms of the relationships between stakeholders; more 
specifically, it is identifiable by looking at how the Sourcebook describes power and 
how power can be ‘levelled’. In The Anti-Politics Machine (2003), Ferguson illustrates 
the unforeseen effects of a depoliticized participatory approached development project 
in Lesotho. Because of improvement in infrastructure and the creation of an 
administrative centre, the Lesotho government eventually expanded their state power to 
a mountain region they did not have access to prior to the development project. 
Ferguson offers a perspective that sees the development apparatus in Lesotho not 
primarily as a machine for eliminating poverty, but rather as a machine for reinforcing 
and expanding state power which takes ‘poverty’ as its point of entry (ibid: 255). This 
powerful effect might not have been the intention of the development planners, but it 
happened by reducing poverty into a technical problem, whilst undermining the 
significance and power of the state. By suspending politics from even the most sensitive 
political operations, Ferguson calls the development apparatus in Lesotho ‘the anti-
politics machine’ (ibid: 256). So how then does power operate in the case studies I have 
presented in this thesis? Alternatively, what is its point of entry? The answer to these 
questions, I argue, can be found by looking at how the World Bank perceives power and 
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more importantly how it ‘manages’ power. First, the Sourcebook applies power 
primarily to those with centralized and institutional power, i.e. government officials and 
ministers. Moreover, these groups of people are always included as participants in 
participatory initiatives. This creates a powerful premise for stakeholder participation as 
a social process; since government representatives always participate as stakeholders in 
World Bank development projects, other stakeholders will interact in social processes 
with asymmetrical relations of power. According to the Sourcebook, this is especially 
true when dealing with direct beneficiaries. These groups of people are usually those 
furthest removed from the institutional centre, and thus have weaker positions. 
Ferguson describes how a project creates powerful effects by depoliticizing 
development, i.e. by undermining the significance of the political landscape within 
everything operates. The notion of ‘levelling’ power in the Sourcebook, tell us that the 
World Bank sees power as something that can be controlled and manipulated by 
participatory techniques. Inasmuch, the World Bank does not depoliticize politics, as 
attention to powerful stakeholders must be maintained to ensure that participatory 
projects sustain. The World Bank does however depoliticize power. When ‘weaker’ 
stakeholders such as Nigerian women farmers or a Bedouin community enter 
development processes, power must be ‘levelled’ to ensure that all stakeholders has 
equal opportunities to let their voices be heard, to make decisions and to handle 
resources. However, as described in the case studies, to ‘level’ power is to arrange 
things and people; to ‘level’ power is to exclude and to include; to ‘level’ power is to 
create new groups with administrative and organizational capabilities; to ‘level’ power 
is to create specific frameworks of interaction and to put limitations on how people are 
allowed to behave. To ‘level’ power in World Bank participatory processes is thus a 
contradictory endeavour, as to manage power is also to exercise power.        
 
Stakeholder Participation as a Productive Practice 
In this thesis, I have discussed and illustrated the importance of technical knowledge in 
participatory approached World Bank development activities. McNeill stated that ‘the 
very nature of the World Bank…is technocratic’ (2004: 112). As earlier mentioned, 
Dean argues that if government is to achieve its ends, then it must use technical means, 
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means that are a condition of governing and often impose limits on its capabilities. The 
descriptions or performance of stakeholder participation as depicted in the Sourcebook, 
certainly corroborate the view of technical knowledge both as a ‘condition’ of 
stakeholder participation and as something that ‘limits’ the capabilities of stakeholder 
participation. How stakeholder participation is limited is most evident in how it 
arranges content and disposes things. In the Nigeria case, stakeholders were arranged in 
order to create an operational space of decision-making. In the Egypt case, the Bedouin 
community was arranged to create an operational community group, reinforced 
administratively and organizationally in order to participate efficiently. In the Colombia 
case, interaction was arranged so that participants could perform and internalize 
operational knowledge that would produce clear outcomes. I argue that the power that 
operates within stakeholder participation as an organized practice does not have 
domination as its goal; rather, it is an exercise of power informed by an operational 
logic that emphasizes productivity through ‘efficiency’, ‘good results’ and ‘clear 
outcomes’. To achieve these goals, task managers have sometimes gone against the 
interests of certain stakeholders, for example as illustrated in the two instances of 
conflict during the Colombia workshop. However, the way stakeholder participation is 
arranged in order to achieve certain results is also explained as an approach to 
development that benefits all stakeholders, whether they participate directly or not. 
Stakeholder is thus understood in the Sourcebook as an approach that caters to the 
interests of those affected by the outcomes.     
Bøås & McNeill suggests that policies in multilateral institutions are the outcome 
of interplay between institutional demands and ideas (2004: 220). It is explicitly 
expressed that the Sourcebook is not a policy document on participation (1996: xi). 
However, I suggest that this reluctance towards being definite about participation 
underscores the conflict between the traditional external expert stance and the 
participatory stance. The external expert stance offers a high degree of control that 
certainly benefits the World Bank’s operational demands, but history has shown that 
projects designed in this manner often fail after implementation. Projects designed and 
implemented collaborately on the other hand, offers higher degrees of sustainability; 
however, the mere inclusion of other interests in decision-making processes makes 
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development activities less predictable, which can threaten the operational demands for 
delivery. The opposite characteristics of participation and operational demands thus 
become a quandary for the World Bank. I argue, that the solution to this quandary lies 
in the how the World Bank translates stakeholder participation rationalizes it as a 
practice. The examples of stakeholder participation described in the three case studies 
are all human-centred approaches to development in the sense that they address, and in 
different degrees incorporate local stakeholders in development activities. However, the 
ways in which stakeholder participation is translated and arranged, produce results that 
reflect the World Bank’ operational demands for delivery. On the subject of the 
relationship between ideas and power, Bøås & McNeill states that: 
 
We argue that power relations in the multilateral system are used to promote some ideas and some 
specific interpretations of ideas over other possible ideas and interpretations of ideas (2004: 207). 
 
I argue that stakeholder participation and its various interpretations as described in the 
Sourcebook are the consequence of tensions between the opposing ideas of the ‘external 
expert stance’ and the ‘collaborative stance’. Moreover, the way in which the quandary 
of these conflicting ideas is solved creates relationships of power through technically 
orientated arrangements that seeks specific ends. Thus, I suggest that the examples of 
stakeholder participation as described in the Sourcebook can be viewed as operational 
participation, i.e. as participation to the extent that the operational logic and rationality 
of the World Bank allows. 
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Conclusion  
 
 
In this thesis, I have described and analyzed the World Bank Participation Sourcebook 
as a performance of stakeholder participation. As a performance, the Sourcebook tells 
stories of struggle, drama and conflict, but also of sacrifice and altruism. It tells stories 
of people that are divided, but still manages to come together against the odds to battle 
their problems for the common good of all. Written primarily towards people who 
already have decided on using participatory approach in their professional work, the 
Sourcebook tells them that participatory approaches to development can be hard and 
sometimes frustrating, but also rewarding. Rewarding not only on a professional level, 
but also on a human level as participatory approaches to development is viewed and 
described as a thoroughly human activity. The Sourcebook views stakeholder 
participation as a sustainable strategy to development that empowers those affected by it 
by allowing local stakeholders to participate. I argue that this is what the Sourcebook as 
a performance is trying to communicate.       
However, my approach to the participatory processes has presented a perspective 
that differs quite drastically from what the Sourcebook is trying to communicate. Prior 
to the writing of this thesis, I was largely unfamiliar with the intricacies of World Bank 
development activities. With this rather naïve starting point, I soon became aware of 
just how directed the participatory approaches appeared. I discovered that participation 
as depicted in the Sourcebook was not only considerably removed from the notion of 
‘popular participation’; the ways in which participation was rationalized into practice, 
also illustrated a number of constraints that limited the very definition of stakeholder 
participation. In the first three chapters of this thesis, I described three case studies that 
illustrate different versions of arrangement and management. The Nigeria case in 
chapter one described a project that sought to formulate solutions that would strengthen 
the inclusion of women farmers in agricultural extension programs, and did so 
ironically, by excluding women farmers from the space of decision-making. The Egypt 
case in chapter two described the social mapping of a Bedouin community, which 
consequently led to the invention of a new group through the formation of a community 
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group that would act and make decisions on the behalf of the community as a whole. 
The Colombia case in chapter three described the participation and interaction of 
government representatives within a meticulously framed workshop that eventually 
produced predictable outcomes.  
In chapter one, I referred to the participatory concerns of the World Bank to 
explain the management of stakeholders in the Nigeria case. The first concern focused 
on the importance of government as participants. The other two concerns commented 
on the importance of levelling power and interaction when beneficiaries were to 
participate in processes with other, more powerful stakeholders. Levelling techniques 
such as the use of ‘surrogates’ and ‘building community capacity’ fundamentally 
impacted the participatory efforts in the Nigeria case and the Egypt case respectively. In 
the second and third chapter, I utilized Latour’s model of translation. This model 
allowed me to formulate a number of translations according to specific strategies, which 
illustrated how the World Bank was able to enrol others (meaning stakeholders into 
participatory processes) by catering to their specific interests, whilst simultaneously 
controlling their behaviour. By translating ‘stakeholder participation’ the task managers 
were able to arrange and manage the complex social world they were faced with; in 
other words, participatory content was translated and arranged in ways that produced 
predictable and ‘operational-friendly’ outcomes. To continue the analogy of 
participation as a performance, the stakeholders in the three case studies were not 
writing their own stories; they were rather acting out an already written script. This 
script may have allowed a certain amount of improvisation, but only within a set 
structure that limited the extent to which participants could act. This script divided 
stakeholders into extras, supporting actors and stars; the script defined the sets in which 
scenes were acted out; it was a script in which stakeholders performed a narrative that 
lead towards ends that, at least in the eyes of the World Bank, appeared to be happy.  
The participatory activities described in the three case studies all contain 
instances of control; I have argued that these controlling mechanisms are the results of 
how participation was translated and arranged. In the fourth chapter of this thesis, I 
turned to Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’. Whereas Latour emphasizes the 
formulation of strategic translations that allows enrolment of others through interests 
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and simultaneously control those enrolled for specific purposes, Foucault focuses on 
how the mentality, or rationality of government arrange things in such a way that it 
achieves certain ends. I approached participation as a ‘regime of practices’ and showed 
how ‘the art of government’ could be identified in World Bank participatory projects. I 
did this by looking at participation as a practice, and more importantly how 
participation as a rational activity was affected by dimensions of knowledge or 
discourse. These dimensions appeared in different forms and interrelated with the 
translations of stakeholder participation. How the Sourcebook explains and perceives 
visibility, its expressed reliance on technical solutions, and institutional knowledge and 
operational demands, affect how participation is rationalized and translated when 
transformed into practice. Moreover, how stakeholder participation was translated had 
effects on the ‘arrangement of things’ in participatory processes, and affected the way in 
which people were able to participate, i.e. their conduct in participatory processes.  
The ways in which stakeholder participation was informed by certain forms of 
knowledge and rationality did not just illustrate ways of governing, but also how 
government works through those governed. Governmentality as the ‘conduct of 
conduct’ offers a perspective that views power as something working through people, 
rather than something that is imposed on people. By referring to the Nigeria case and 
the Egypt case, I showed how translations enrolled and arranged stakeholders by 
catering to their specific interests. In the Colombia case governmentality as ‘the conduct 
of the self’ was more explicit. The Colombian participants openly and emotionally 
expressed the empowering feeling of finding solutions to their own problems. However, 
I related this instance to the way in which the workshop was framed; the extent to which 
interaction was guided allowed me to view the Colombia workshop, less as a space in 
which knowledge was ‘generated’ and more as a space where a specific kind of 
knowledge was ‘internalised’.     
This thesis have tried to identify how the participatory processes described in the 
Sourcebook are managed and arranged in ways that constrains the more inclusive 
definition of stakeholder participation. I have also tried to explain why such 
arrangements occurred by focusing on the result orientated aspects of the three case 
studies. How stakeholders and spaces of decision-making are arranged and managed 
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seemingly, favour a logic that emphasizes participatory and project efficiency. Thus, the 
knowledge and rationality of the World Bank that informs stakeholder participation is 
largely concerned with the operational demands that link investments with clear 
outcomes. Mosse’s notion of ‘dual logic’ comments on the tensions between a logic that 
wants development projects to be perceived as participatory, and a logic that emphasis 
the demands for operational delivery. I have argued that the way stakeholder 
participation is transformed into practice through various translations aims to solve the 
predicament of this tension. I have suggested that stakeholder participation, as a practice 
is a rational response to the quandary of opposing ideas of how to approach 
development. In other words, the World Bank solves the conflict between traditional 
approaches to development as ‘ready made policy’ and participation as ‘policy in the 
making’ by translating and arranging stakeholder participation in ways that create 
manageable development processes that produces predictable and ‘operational-friendly’ 
results. The power that operates through the practice of stakeholder participation is thus 
the result of tensions between ideas. I have suggested that stakeholder participation as 
performed in the Sourcebook takes the shape of what I have called operational 
participation; stakeholders are included in development initiatives, but their 
participation is limited to the extent that their interaction does not disrupt the 
operational demands of delivery in World Bank activities.  
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